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SUPPORT YOUR FAMILY BUT LEAVE OUT UNCLE SAM:
A CALL FOR FEDERAL GIFT TAX REFORM
ROBERT G. POPOVICH*
INTRODUCTION
From the time they are old enough to understand, we teach our
children to love and care for one another. God commands "honor
thy father and thy mother"1 and "love thy neighbor as thyself."2 Yet if
carrying out these obligations requires financial expenditures, the In-
ternal Revenue Service (IRS) may promulgate an Eleventh Command-
ment: Pay thy gift taxes! Transfers of money or property for the
support of another, if based solely on a fundamental sense of moral
obligation, are technically "gifts" subject to gift tax. 3
Surely a concept as complex and often times convoluted as the
federal gift tax must apply only to transactions that are carefully
* Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law; B.S., California
State University Northridge; M.B.T. (Tax), University of Southern California; J.D., Pep-
perdine University School of Law. The author wishes to thank his primary research assis-
tant, Denise Schultz, for her support, tireless work, and dedication to this project. The
author also wishes to thank research assistants Paul Tyler and Andrew Moritz for their
contributions, and to acknowledge the support of colleagues and students at Pepperdine
University School of Law.
1. Exodus 20:12 (New KingJames).
2. Leviticus 20:18 (New KingJames).
3. The Internal Revenue Code imposes a tax on transfers of property made during an
individual's lifetime minus certain exclusions and deductions. I.R.C. §§ 2501-2524 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993); see also infra notes 25-34 and accompanying text. The tax is assessed on a
cumulative basis with rates beginning at 18% and escalating to a 55% maximum. I.R.C.
§ 2502 (1988) (referring to the rates provided in I.R.C. § 2001 (1988)); see also infra notes
29-31 and accompanying text.
In addition to the federal tax, many states impose some form of a death tax. Tradi-
tionally, the form of death taxation used by the states was the inheritance tax. BORIS I.
BITTKER & ErAs CLAR, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr TAXATION 11 (6th ed. 1990). Unlike the
estate tax, which is levied on the donor's privilege of transferring wealth, the inheritance
tax is levied on the donee's privilege of receiving property from the decedent. Id. Most
states have moved away from the inheritance tax and the modern trend is to impose a
.pick-up" tax in the maximum amount allowed under I.R.C. § 2011 as a credit for state
death taxes against the federal estate tax. Id. n.23. At present, 28 states impose a pick-up
tax, 18 states use a combination of the inheritance tax and estate tax, and 5 states rely
solely on the estate tax. John M.Janiga & Louis S. Harrison, The Case for Retention of the State
Death Tax Credit in the Federal Transfer Tax Scheme: Yust Say No" to a Deduction, 21 PEPP. L.
Rxv. 695, 701-02 (1994). Although states continue to impose these death taxes, the money
received constitutes only a small fraction of overall revenue. BrrTKER & CLARK, supra, at 2.
For example, in 1987 the states, in the aggregate, collected $247 billion in total taxes, but
only $3 billion (a little more than 1%) came from death and gift taxes combined. Id.
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crafted as part of an individual's estate or financial plan. Would not
such a tax apply only to the megawealthy so as to prevent them from
escaping estate tax liability? There is no implication of the gift tax
system to everyday people facing everyday scenarios-or is there?
A son or daughter is entering college. In view of their child's
accomplishments, the proud parents are devoted to furthering their
child's education and, despite the high cost of such an endeavor, pro-
vide meals, housing, and other financial assistance to their child. The
IRS most likely has a "winner" here-the proud parents have ostensi-
bly made gifts that may subject them to federal gift taxes.4
Collegiate parents are not the only individuals who may unknow-
ingly wander into the lair of the federal gift tax. For example, a de-
voted son, daughter, or other relative provides in-home care for an
elderly parent suffering the devastation of Alzheimer's disease. Here
too, the caregiver, while exhibiting the honorable human traits of
care and compassion, may be burdened with gift tax liability.
5
Congress could not possibly have intended the gift tax statutes to
burden individuals making these types of support transfers. Even the
IRS, while the champion of evil in the minds of the general public,
would not impose a gift tax on these types of transfers-or would it?
Take the case of a forty-three-year-old woman afflicted with severe cer-
ebral palsy. Totally disabled from the waist down with limited use of
only one arm, capable of only limited communication, and requiring
around-the-clock nursing care, she was left with no means of support
or care after the death of her mother.6 Her brother, also afflicted
with cerebral palsy and partially disabled, took care of his sister by
providing food, shelter, and medical expenses.7 Understandably, the
faithful and compassionate brother did not consider that his support,
pursuant to his mother's dying wish and compelled out of moral obli-
4. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-6(b) (2) (1984) (demonstrating the exclusion for cer-
tain qualified transfers for tuition expenses).
5. The IRS has stated, for example, that income from a trust established for the bene-
fit of the grantor's parents constitutes a taxable gift. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 82-25-091 (Mar. 25,
1982). However, the IRS also recognized that there is no gift "to the extent that current
income of the trust is applied or distributed in satisfaction of the grantor's legal obligation
to support or maintain his parents." Id.; see also infta notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
6. Tech. Adv. Mem. 81-35-032 (June 1, 1981); see also Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,702 (Apr.
28, 1981) (discussing whether payments made by the decedent during her life for the
medical expenses and support of her adult handicapped children are gifts for federal gift
tax purposes).
7. Tech. Adv. Mem. 81-35-032. The mother's will left the entire residue of her estate
to her son with the following notation: "I intentionally make no provision herein for my
daughter ... . for the reason that I am sure that her support, comfort and well-being will be
adequately and properly provided for by her. . . brother." Id.
344 [VOL. 55:343
FEDERAL GiFr TAX REFORM
gation, would have gift tax ramifications. The IRS, on the other hand,
did consider the gift tax ramifications of this support and classified.
these expenditures as gifts for gift tax purposes, thereby subjecting the
brother to gift tax liability.' The IRS reasoned that in order for sup-
port payments to escape the gift tax, there must be a legal duty to
support rather than a purely moral obligation.9 Because the brother's
support was not pursuant to any legal obligation, but was instead moti-
vated by love and a moral obligation, the gift tax hatchet fell.
In light of the recent emphasis by political leaders on promoting
traditional "family values,"1" the idea that such support might be sub-
ject to gift tax seems contrary to public policy and, furthermore, poses
practical concerns. First and foremost, it is not generally understood
by the layman that such expenditures may result in taxable gifts."
This leads to mass, albeit unintentional, noncompliance with the gift
tax statutes.12 Public ignorance and consequential noncompliance,
however, do not seem to have prompted aggressive enforcement ef-
forts by the IRS. Perhaps this is because of the minimal potential cur-
8. Id. In addition to the expenditures by the son, support given to the disabled
daughter by the parents before they died also amounted to transfers subject to gift tax. Id.
It should be noted that current law provides a limited gift tax exclusion for certain medical
payments made on behalf of another. See infra notes 147-150 and accompanying text.
9. The IRS noted that property transferred by a taxpayer to discharge his legal obliga-
tion to support his minor children is a transfer for adequate and full consideration and is
not taxable as a gift. Tech. Adv. Mem. 81-35-032. "The duty of support, however, must be
a legally enforceable obligation rather than a purely moral obligation." Id.; see infra notes
73-79 and accompanying text. In this situation it was determined that under New York law,
there was no legal duty of support. Tech. Adv. Mem. 81-35-032.
10. The political nature of this concept was illustrated in 1992, when Vice President
Dan Quayle sparred with television actress Candice Bergen (portraying newscaster Murphy
Brown as a single mother) over preserving the traditional two-parent family unit. Family
values have even permeated the tax area: "'Higher taxes have been tearing at the fabric of
the American family, and [the legislature] can't just focus on economic arguments and
ignore family values.'" Richard Kirkland, Today's GOP, FORTUNE, Feb. 6, 1995, at 50 (quot-
ing Ralph Reed, executive director of the Christian Coalition).
11. See Bernard V. Lentz et al., Prospective Federal Taxation: A Panel Discussion, 31 N.Y.U.
INST. ON FED. TAX. 1637, 1669 (1973) ("At least I know of very few clients who have come
to me suggesting that there might be a gift tax problem in this area. I think it is probably a
fair assumption that there are relatively few people who think these ... [support-type]
transfers, are taxable gifts.").
The term "taxable gift" has a specific meaning for purposes of the gift tax and it re-
flects certain exclusions and deductions. See infra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
Many otherwise taxable support-type transfers will not, in fact, result in taxable gifts be-
cause of the allowance of a $10,000 per year, per transferee annual exclusion in computing
taxable gifts. I.R.C. § 2503 (1988). See infra note 33.
12. The Supreme Court has recognized the heavy burden on the taxpayer due to the
fact that "the tax system is basically one of self-assessment, complexities and uncertainties
in the gift taxation area." Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 347 (1984) (Powell,J.,
dissenting).
1996]
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rent penalty,13 or perhaps out of fear over unjustifiably wading into
the waters of public outcry.
Caught between Scylla and Charybdis are the tax advisors, who
are left in a predicament as to how to advise their clients. Should they
instruct their clients to fill out a gift tax return and pay tax for any
support expenditures arising from a moral obligation, or should they
(or can they) intentionally fail to inquire about their client's support
expenditures and hope for a lack of IRS enforcement? Aside from
this practical and ethical issue from the advisor's perspective, subject-
ing transfers for the support of others to a gift tax violates the core
principles of human compassion 4 and does not promote the general
policy for the imposition of gift taxes.
Although commentators have suggested that the law in this area
has been "appropriately quiet," and that it is unsuitable for legislative
change, so that "[plurists simply should contain any urge to remove
this rough edge in gift tax administration," 5 it is undoubtedly an area
of confusion that should be addressed. This Article focuses on the
deficiencies in current federal gift tax provisions with respect to trans-
fers of money and property for the support of others. Part I of this
Article explains the general structure of the federal gift tax and dis-
cusses the basic concepts of what constitutes a gift, specifically, the
role that consideration plays in determining whether the transfer of a
taxable gift has occurred.16 Part II focuses on expenditures for an-
other's support, distinguishing financial support for the discharge of
one's legal obligations, which is not a taxable gift, from support aris-
ing out of moral obligation, which is taxable. 7 Part III discusses the
concerns created by the current law, including the ethical issues of
counsel and advising."8 Part IV concludes with possible solutions to
13. Milton L. Ray, The Transfer-for-Consumption Problem: Support and the Gift Tax, 59 OR.
L. Rxv. 425, 426-27, 444 (1981). Mere failure to file a gift tax return due to neglect results
in a penalty of 5% of the tax due for each month past due, with a maximum of 25%. Id. at
445.
14. In granting tax benefits for individuals who make gifts to charity, the IRS itself has
indirectly acknowledged that transfers made out of human compassion and moral obliga-
tion should not be taxed. Tax deductions for transfers to charity are provided by the Code
in the areas of gift tax, I.R.C. § 2522(a) (1988), estate tax, id. § 2055(a), and income tax,
id. § 170(a), (b)(1). Indeed, it is difficult to articulate why support to a public charity
deserves a tax break, but transfers to support a needy friend or relative are taxable. See
infra notes 140-146 and accompanying text.
15. John L. Peschel, Recent Developments in Estate Planning, MAJOR TAX PLAN. 1 1300,
1304.1, at 13-32 (1982).
16. See infra notes 20-67 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 68-108 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 109-139 and accompanying text.
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the problem, including a "transfer-for-consumption" proposal, which
would exclude expenditures for the reasonable support of others. 9
I. THE BAsIcs OF THE GIFT TAX
A. Gift Tax Framework
A tax on the privilege of transferring wealth from one individual
to another was first enacted in 1916 in the form of an estate or death
transfer tax.2" The concept of such an estate tax, while arguably dra-
conian, is simple: Assess a tax based on the value of the decedent's
assets that are transferred to the beneficiaries upon such decedent's
death.21 Although ostensibly a revenue-raiser for World War I, the
enactment of the estate tax was more likely prompted by a growing
concern over the large accumulation of wealth in a small number of
families-the Fords, Rockefellers, and Carnegies of the day would no
longer perpetuate great wealth from generation to generation without
some diminution by tax.2" In the context of such a tax, the use of the
phrase "the privilege of transferring wealth" is derived from the fact
that the estate tax is primarily the obligation of the transferor/dece-
dent (more appropriately the decedent's estate),23 and not that of the
transferee/beneficiary.
Although the 1916 legislation made testamentary dispositions of
assets subject to tax, this original transfer tax left available an alterna-
19. See infra notes 140-199 and accompanying text.
20. Edward J. McCaffey, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283,
284 (1994). Due to the unequal distribution of privately held wealth, scholarly support for
some sort of a wealth transfer tax has remained strong over the years. Id. Unlike the ever-
changing income tax system, today's estate tax remains quite similar to the initial 1916
structure. Id. at 284-85.
21. The current Internal Revenue Code provides that a tax is imposed on "the transfer
of the taxable estate of every decedent who is a citizen or resident of the United States."
I.R.C. § 2001 (1988). The value of the decedent's gross estate includes "the value at the
time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situ-
ated" in which the decedent had an interest. Id. § 2031; see also id. § 2033. The Code also
allows for certain deductions from the estate including bequests to charity, id. § 2055,
claims, debts, and expenses of the estate, id. § 2053, casualty losses, id. § 2054, and marital
transfers, id. § 2056. In addition, the Code provides one lifetime unified credit in the
amount of $192,800 that applies first to taxable inter vivos gifts, and the remainder to the
taxable estate. Id. §§ 2010, 2505. Although the concept of such an estate tax may be con-
ceptually simple, there are now many detailed provisions that make determination of the
tax liability rather complex.
22. The estate of Mrs. Andrew Carnegie illustrates the potential tax liability that
wealthy individuals face. Out of her $20.5 million estate, $2.5 million was left to charity
and $11.5 million (over half of the total estate!) went for the payment of estate taxes.
BITrKER & CLAR, supra note 3, at 7.
23. I.R.C. § 2002 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) provides that the estate tax imposed "shall be
paid by the executor (of the estate]."
1996]
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five by which individuals could avoid tax on the transfer of wealth:
inter vivos gifts. No significant statutory roadblocks prevented the
diminution of an individual's estate by the transfer of property before
death. The estate tax, by its very nature, applied only to a decedent's
testamentary transfers and, except in very limited provisions, had no
application to gifts made during an individual's life.2 4
To close this gap, a gift tax-a toll on the privilege of transferring
wealth during an individual's life-was enacted in 1932.25 Transfers
24. The 1916 estate tax sought to impose a tax on lifetime transfers where the donor
did not intend for the donee to receive possession or enjoyment of the property until after
the donor's death. Mark R. Siegel, Retained Possession and Enjoyment: Searching Out the Real-
ity for Residential Transfers, 24 Sw. U. L. REV. 81, 83 (1994). Thus, inter vivos gifts made in
an attempt to avoid the estate tax when the donor effectively retained a life estate in the
property were subject to the estate tax under the 1916 postponed possession and enjoy-
ment clause. Id.; Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, ch. 463, § 202, 39 Stat. 756, 777.
The clause called for a tax "[t]o the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent
has at any time made a transfer ... in contemplation of or intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after his death." § 202, 39 Stat. at 777.
Despite the enactment of the gift tax, the current Code still provides exceptions to the
general rule that the estate tax applies only to a decedent's testamentary transfers. First, if
the transferor kept sufficient power to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate an inter vivos
transfer, the amount over which the grantor retained the power is pulled into the taxable
estate. I.R.C. § 2038(a) (1988). For example, if the grantor sets up an irrevocable trust but
retains the power to accumulate income or make early distributions to the designated ben-
eficiary, § 2038 will cause inclusion in the grantor's estate. Id. Second, if the grantor
makes a lifetime transfer but retains a life interest in the income or the right to use the
property, the entire value of the property transferred will be included in the grantor's
taxable estate. Id. § 2036(a). This inclusion arose from the 1916 postponed possession
and enjoyment clause. § 202, 39 Stat. at 777. Thus, if the grantor transfers interest in an
apartment to his child but continues to live there until his death, the grantor has retained
an effective life estate and the entire amount of the apartment is subject to estate tax. One
of the more complex examples of the lifetime transfers that may be included in the dece-
dent's estate occurs if the beneficiary is required to outlive the grantor before he can
obtain possession of the property, and the grantor holds a reversionary interest of more
than 5% of the property transferred. I.R.C. § 2037(a) (1988). To illustrate, Grantor sets
up the following trust: "To Alex or Alex's estate as long as Grantor is alive and at Grantor's
death, to Bob if Bob is still living. If Bob predeceases Grantor, the property reverts back to
Grantor's estate." Because Bob's interest is contingent on surviving the grantor (and as-
suming it is worth more than 5% of the value of the property at the time of the transfer),
and the grantor retained a reversionary interest, the value of Bob's interest is included in
the grantor's taxable estate. Finally, the Code provides that any transfers that would be
included under the above provisions are included in the grantor's estate if they existed
within three years of the grantor's death. Id. § 2035. Using the above retained life estate
example, if the grantor lived in the apartment until 1992 and died in 1994, the apartment
is still included in the taxable estate because the relinquishment of the de facto life estate
was within three years of death.
25. The government's first attempt at imposing a gift tax occurred in 1924 with a trans-
fer tax that was assessed annually on a noncumulative basis. The taxpayer was provided
with a $50,000 annual exemption, and a $500 annual exclusion for each donee. Revenue
Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 321 (a)(1)-(3), 43 Stat. 253, 314. Because of the large
annual exemption, a taxpayer could easily avoid both estate and gift taxes by making inter
[VOL. 55:343
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at death remained within the domain of the estate tax, while lifetime
transfers came within the scope of the gift tax. Thus, the gift tax
served as a backstop to the estate tax26 to prevent the tax-free diminu-
tion of an individual's estate. 27 Again, the term "privilege" is aptly
applied to the transfer of wealth covered by the gift tax because the
transferor/donor, and not the transferee/donee, is primarily liable
for the tax.28
The basic framework of the gift tax is, like that of the estate tax,
rather simple. The tax is assessed on "taxable gifts" at rates ranging
from eighteen to fifty-five percent.29 While the gift tax is assessed on
an annual basis,"° it is computed on a cumulative or lifetime basis.
vivos transfers under $50,000 for a period of several years. John G. Steinkamp, Common
Sense and the Gift Tax Annual Exclusion, 72 NEB. L. REv. 106, 110 (1993). In an attempt to
reduce federal taxes, the 1924 gift tax was repealed in 1926. Because of an increase in
federal deficits caused by the Depression, however, Congress returned to the drawing
board in 1932 and enacted the antecedent to our current federal gift tax statutes. Id. at
110-11.
26. Without the gift tax, the estate tax "could achieve neither its social function of
checking the undue concentration of wealth nor its incidental fiscal function of raising
revenue." BORIS I. BIT'rKER & LAWRENCE M. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND GIFT TAXA-
TION at ix (4th ed. 1972). Congress itself noted that the gift tax "tend[s] to discourage
transfers for the purpose of avoiding the estate tax." S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. pt. 2, at 496, 525. No longer is a person able to make tax-
free inter vivos gifts to diminish his estate. In fact, the cumulative nature of the gift tax was
intended to result in a tax that approached the amount of estate tax that would have been
owed if the gift had not been made. Steinkamp, supra note 25, at 111 (citing H.R. REP. No.
708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. pt. 2, at 457, 477; S. REP. No. 665,
supra, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. pt. 2, at 496, 525); see also infra note 31 and accompanying
text.
27. See Stephen W. Schlissel & Bryan C. Skarlatos, Some Federal Gift & Estate Tax Conse-
quences of Support Payments and Property Settlements, 10 J. AM. AcAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 79, 79
(1993).
28. I.R.C. § 2502(c) (1988) states that the gift tax imposed "shall be paid by the do-
nor." A donee may become liable for payment of the donor's gift tax obligation in the
event the donor fails to pay the tax when due. Id. § 6324(b); Treas. Reg. § 301.6324-1 (as
amended in 1972). In such instances, the donee is liable to the extent of the value of the
gift. I.R.C. § 6324(b); Treas Reg. § 301.6324-1.
29. I.R.C. § 2001(c) (1988). I.R.C. § 2502 provides that the computation of gift tax is
subject to the rates found in I.R.C. § 2001 (c). As of 1995, the top tax bracket was 55%. As
with income taxes, I.R.C. § 1, the gift tax is progressive, so the greater the gift, the greater
the tax rate. For example, if Sheila made total taxable gifts in 1995 of $80,000 (after exclu-
sions and deductions), her gift tax liability (before credits) would be $18,200. So, if Sheila
made double the taxable gifts in 1995 for a total of $160,000 (after exclusions and deduc-
tions), it seems logical that her gift tax liability (before credits) would double and equal
$36,400. But when computing the tax, Sheila is in a higher bracket because her taxable
gifts increased. As a result, her gift tax liability (before credits) on $160,000 of taxable gifts
is actually $42,000.
30. Any individual who makes a taxable gift in the calendar year is responsible for filing
a gift tax return on or before April 15 following the close of the calendar year. I.R.C.
§ 6075(b)(1) (1988).
1996]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
This results in the application of higher gift tax rates as more taxable
gifts are made over an individual's life."1
31. Id. § 2502(a)(1)-(2). The following problem illustrates the cumulative nature of
the gift tax over one's lifetime. The six computational steps reflected below are explained
in Treas. Reg. § 25.2502-1(a) (as amended in 1992).
In 1993 through 1995, Sheila made the following gifts:
- 1993, gifts (after exclusions and deductions) aggregating $300,000.
- 1994, gifts (after exclusions and deductions) aggregating $300,000.
- 1995, gifts (after exclusions and deductions) aggregating $300,000.
1993 Gift Tax Computation
Step One: taxable gifts in current year (1993) = $300,000.
Step Two: aggregate taxable gifts from prior years (after June 6, 1932) = 0.
Step Three: aggregate lifetime taxable gifts (sum of steps one and two) =
$300,000.
Step Four: tentative tax on aggregate lifetime gifts = $87,800.
Step Five: tax on prior years' taxable gifts (from step two) - 0.
Step Six: tax on current year's taxable gifts (tax in step four less tax in step
five) = $87,800 - 0 = $87,800. This is the amount of tax before application of any
credits (see below).
1994 Gift Tax Computation
Step One: taxable gifts in current year.(1994) = $300,000.
Step Two: aggregate taxable gifts from prior years (after June 6, 1932) =
$300,000.
Step Three: aggregate lifetime taxable gifts (sum of steps one and two) =
$600,000.
Step Four: tentative tax on aggregate lifetime gifts = $192,800.
Step Five: tax on prior years' taxable gifts ($300,000 from step two) = $87,800.
Step Six: tax on current year's taxable gifts (tax in step four less tax in step
five) = $192,800 - 87,800 = $105,000. This is the amount of tax before application
of any credits (see below).
1995 Gift Tax Computation
Step One: taxable gifts in current year (1995) = $300,000.
Step Two: aggregate taxable gifts from prior years (after June 6, 1932) =
$600,000.
Step Three: aggregate lifetime taxable gifts (sum of steps one and two) =
$900,000.
Step Four: tentative tax on aggregate lifetime gifts = $306,800.
Step Five: tax on prior years' taxable gifts ($600,000 from step two) =
$192,800.
Step Six: tax on current year's taxable gifts (tax in step four less tax in step
five) = $306,800 - 192,800 = $114,000. This is the amount of tax before applica-
tion of any credits (see below).
Net Gift Tax Liabilities-Appication of Unified Credit
I.R.C. § 2505 provides for a lifetime unified credit in the amount of $192,800
to offset gift (and effectively, estate) tax liabilities. Application of the unified
credit to our example would result in the following net gift tax liabilities:
1993 Net Gift Tax Liability
[VOL. 55:343
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A "taxable gift" is generally the value of property transferred by
gift3 2 less certain exclusions33 and deductions.3 4 Nevertheless, to thor-
Gift Tax before credit (from above) $ 87,800
Available credit (192,800)
Net Gift Tax Liability None
Unified Credit remaining $105,000
1994 Net Gft Tax Liability
Gift Tax before credit (from above) $105,000
Available credit (105,000)
Net Gift Tax Liability None
Unified Credit remaining None
1995 Net Gift Tax Liability
Gift Tax before credit (from above) $114,000
Available credit None
Net Gift Tax Liability $114,000
Unified Credit remaining None
Id.
32. I.R.C. § 2512 (1988). "If the gift is made in property, the value thereof at the date
of the gift shall be considered the amount of the gift." Id. The value of the property is the
price at which a knowledgeable, willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any
compulsion to buy or sell, would agree. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as amended in 1992). If
the property transferred is in the form of stocks and bonds, the value of such property is
the fair market value per share or bond on the date of the gift. Id. § 25.2512-2. The value
of a secured or unsecured note is generally deemed to be the amount of unpaid principal,
plus any accrued interest up to the date of the gift. Id. § 25.2512-4. The value of a business
is the amount that a willing buyer and a willing seller would agree upon considering all of
the relevant factors. Id. § 25.2512-3. The relevant factors include a fair appraisal of all the
business assets including good will and the earning capacity of the business. Id. Determin-
ing the value of transferred property often can be difficult. See generally Mitchell M. Gans,
Gift Tax: Valuation Difficulties and Gift Completion, 58 NOTRE DAME L. Rv. 493, 493 (1983)
(examining the valuation-difficulty rule as applied to gifts not immediately capable of
valuation).
33. I.R.C. § 2503 (1988). Before determining the amount of taxable gifts, certain ex-
clusions must be subtracted from the total amount of the taxpayer's annual transfers. First,
certain medical or tuition expenses paid for the benefit of another are excluded from
taxable gifts. Id. § 2503(e); see infta notes 147-155 and accompanying text. Each taxpayer
is also entitled to a yearly $10,000 exclusion for each gift recipient. I.R.C. § 2503(b).
Thus, if Bob has three children and gives each of them $10,000 outright per year, he has
made no taxable gifts. However, to qualify for the annual exclusion, the donee must have
the right to immediate use, possession, or enjoyment of the property. Gifts of future inter-
est, such as reversions and remainders, do not qualify for the annual exclusion. Treas.
Reg. § 2 5.2503-3(a) (as amended in 1983). To illustrate, Bob puts $10,000 per child into a
trust each year instead of making outright gifts, and the trust calls for accumulation of trust
income and nondistribution of trust corpus until sometime in the future. Because the
children's right to receive such income is subject to delay, it is not a present interest and
Bob is not entitled to any annual exclusions. Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3, Ex. 1 (as amended in
1983). Finally, if the donee makes a qualified disclaimer of the gift, it is excluded from
taxable gifts. I.R.C. § 2518 (1988).
34. In addition to exclusions from taxable gifts, the taxpayer is entitled to certain de-
ductions. Any gift to a qualified charity is generally entitled to a gift tax deduction for the
entire amount of the transfer. I.R.C. § 2522 (1988); see infra note 143. Additionally, gifts
made between spouses are deducted in full and not subject to gift tax. I.R.C. § 2523 (1988
& Supp. V 1993).
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oughly comprehend the tortuous quandary of applying the gift tax,
two issues must be addressed: (1) What constitutes "property"?; and
(2) When is a "transfer" considered a "gift"? The latter is addressed
first.
B. What Is a "Gift"for Gift Tax Purposes?
The common-law definition of a gift is "a voluntary transfer of
property to another made gratuitously and without consideration.""5
The determination of a gift for income tax purposes (to ascertain if such
a gift is excluded from the recipient's taxable income36) looks to the
intent of the donor-that is, did the transfer proceed from a "'de-
tached and disinterested generosity"'? 37 Unfortunately, the common-
law definition of a gift is woefully inadequate and income tax rules
are, for the most part, irrelevant in the determination of a gift for gift
tax purposes.3 8
Pursuant to Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 2501, the duty to
pay the gift tax attaches upon the "transfer of property by gift." 9 Ac-
cording to the Treasury regulations, "any transaction in which an in-
terest in property is gratuitously passed or conferred upon another,
regardless of the means or device employed, constitutes a gift subject
to tax."40 While intent to make a gift is clearly required,4' such intent
need not be "gratuitous" in the literal sense. Indeed, a gift for gift tax
purposes could be wholly lacking in the qualitative sentiment that one
35. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 688 (6th ed. 1990).
36. I.R.C. § 102(a) (1988) states that "[g]ross income does not include the value of
property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance." Generally transfers from em-
ployers to employees are not considered "gifts" for purposes of this section. Id. § 102(c).
37. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (quoting Commissioner v.
LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956)). Similarly, Black's Law Dictionary defines a gift for in-
come tax purposes as a transfer made "without conditions, from detached and disinter-
ested generosity, out of affection, respect, charity or like impulses, and not from the
constraining force of any moral or legal duty or from the incentive of anticipated benefits
of an economic nature." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 688 (6th ed. 1990).
38. Inconsistency exists between the estate and gift tax, on the one hand, and the in-
come tax, on the other hand. For example, a property transfer may be sufficiently final to
subject the donor to a gift tax, yet it may not be complete enough to terminate the donor's
income tax liability. See, e.g., Lockard v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 409, 411 (1st Cir. 1948)
(holding that transfers in trust constituted taxable gifts and that the amounts of specific
exemption must be deducted from the specific exemption claimed in the tax return). Sim-
ilarly, a transfer may not shift the income tax liability to the donee, and yet the transfer is
not considered a gift for gift tax purposes. BrrKER & CLARK, supra note 3, at 13.
39. I.R.C. § 2501 (a)(1) (1988).
40. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1994).
41. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Hogle, 165 F.2d 352, 353 (10th Cir. 1947) (finding that
Congress intended the gift tax to apply "to all transactions whereby property or property
rights or interests are donatively passed or conferred upon another" (emphasis added)).
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might envision accompanies the act of making a gift.4 2 Instead, the
Treasury Department focuses on the "objective facts of the transfer
and the circumstances under which it is made, rather than on the
subjective motives of the donor" when determining whether a taxable
gift has been made.4' The objective determination of a transfer by gift
for gift tax purposes is explained in the Treasury regulations as
follows:
Transfers reached by the gift tax are not confined to those
only which, being without a valuable consideration, accord
with the common law concept of gifts, but embrace as well
sales, exchanges, and other dispositions of property for a
consideration to the extent that the value of the property
transferred by the donor exceeds the value in money or
money's worth of the consideration given therefor.'
Put in simple terms, a gift is made by transferring property with-
out receiving consideration of a comparable value in money or
money's worth in return. The Supreme Court has made it clear that
not all common-law forms of consideration are reducible to the requi-
site money or money's worth standard.45 Most notable are the types
of consideration or promises that every first-year law student learns
42. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945). In Wemyss, the taxpayer was
receiving income from her deceased husband's trust, but if she were to remarry, the in-
come payments would cease. Id. at 303-04. To induce the taxpayer to remarry, her new
husband agreed to transfer some stock to the taxpayer in exchange for her wedding vows.
Id. at 304. The taxpayer contended that the stock transfer did not constitute a taxable gift
because her agreement to remarry provided adequate consideration for the stock. Id. at
304-05. The Court did not agree. Consideration not reducible to money value, such as an
agreement to marry, is "'wholly disregarded, and the entire value of the property trans-
ferred constitutes the amount of the gift.'" Id. at 305 (quoting Treas. Reg. 79 (1936 ed.)
Art. 8). In coming to this conclusion, the Court found that Congress "dispensed with the
test of 'donative intent'" when determining taxable gifts and "chose not to require an as-
certainment of what too often is an elusive state of mind." Id. at 306. The Treasury regula-
tions have also adopted this position by stating that "[dlonative intent on the part of the
transferor is not an essential element in the application of the gift tax to the transfer."
Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1 (g) (1) (as amended in 1994). Note that if the Wemyss fact pattern
had been applied in the income tax forum, no gift would have been found because the
transfer was made for a promise to marry rather than out of "'detached and disinterested
generosity.'" Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (quoting Commis-
sioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956)); see also supra notes 35-38 and accompanying
text.
43. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g)(1) (as amended in 1994).
44. Id. § 25.2512-8 (as amended in 1992) (emphasis added).
45. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303; see also supra note 42. The Treasury regulations state this
principle as follows: "A consideration not reducible to a value in money or money's worth,
as love and affection, promise of marriage, etc., is to be wholly disregarded, and the entire
value of the property transferred constitutes the amount of the gift." Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2512-8 (as amended in 1992).
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are entirely sufficient for the basis of an enforceable contract, such as
a promise to stop smoking and drinking for a year, or a promise to
marry.46 Because such consideration cannot be valued in terms of
money or money's worth, it is totally disregarded in the determination
of whether a gift has been made for gift tax purposes.47
This brings us to the focus of this Article: transfers of property
made for another's support or maintenance. A father sends money to
his child for college education expenses, including tuition, room, and
board. A daughter pays the living expenses for her ailing mother. To
determine the gift tax liability of these transfers, several questions
must be answered: Did the father directly or indirectly receive ade-
quate consideration from his child in money or money's worth? Did
the daughter receive sufficient consideration in money or money's
worth? The layman would probably find such an inquiry to be absurd,
and rightly so. These transfers are not the variety that spring to mind
when gift taxes are contemplated. Indeed, taxing these transfers is
not consistent with the rationale behind the federal gift tax. As dis-
cussed previously, the gift tax was implemented to prevent the tax-free
diminution of an individual's estate through inter vivos transfers.4'
Clearly the above transfers are not motivated by an individual's legal
obligation nor a desire to avoid estate taxes. Rather, they originate
from an individual's moral conscience. Nevertheless, the fact that
such transfers may not have been made in exchange for consideration
in money or money's worth might expose the transferor to a gift tax.
When making transfers for the support of another, the determi-
nation of whether the requisite consideration has been received by
the transferor (resulting in no taxable gift) is based upon the trans-
feror's legal support obligations. Generally, when a transfer is made
in discharge of an individual's legal support obligation there is no
gift.49 However, transfers of support that are inspired solely by moral
conscience may very well be subject to a gift tax." This opprobrious
46. See, e.g., Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N.Y. 538, 550-51 (1891) (holding that a nephew who
refrained from drinking, using tobacco, and gambling until he turned 21 had provided
adequate consideration to create a valid contract); Shadwell v. Shadwell, 142 Eng. Rep. 62,
64 (1860) (finding that a promise to marry constitutes adequate consideration to form a
contract).
47. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (as amended in 1992).
48. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court recognized that
the "legislative history of the gift tax provisions reflects that Congress enacted a tax on gifts
to supplement existing estate and income tax laws." Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S.
330, 338 (1984).
49. See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
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result flies in the face of the public policy of caring and providing for
one another.
C. What Is Pperty?
As indicated above, I.R.C. § 2501 imposes the gift tax on the
"transfer of property by gift."5" For example, when an individual gratui-
tously transfers money, jewelry, real estate, or shares of stock to a
friend, little doubt arises that these items are property. Therefore,
assuming that no requisite consideration in money or money's worth
was received, a gift has been made. 2 However, the term "property,"
as used for gift tax purposes, is much more encompassing than these
obvious transfers of tangible assets. It is clear from both legislative
history and court cases that the term property is not to be narrowly
construed. Quite to the contrary, "Congress intended to use the term
'gifts' in its broadest and most comprehensive sense,"" including
"'every species of right or interest protected by law and having an ex-
changeable value."'"
The scope of the term "property," as it applies to transfers by gift,
was tested in Dickman v. Commissioner.5 In Dickman, parents loaned
substantial sums of money to their son and to a corporation owned by
the family.56 These loans "were evidenced by demand notes bearing
no interest."57 The commissioner did not seek to impose the gift tax
on the principal of the loan because it had to be repaid.5" Rather, the
Court said that a gift had been made with respect to the value of the
use of the money because there was no obligation for the son to pay
back any interest.59 The Court rationalized that when the parents
transferred the use of the money, an identifiable property interest
clearly changed hands. This interest had an easily measurable value
that could be associated with the use of the property transferred: the
amount of interest that should have been charged but was not.6 In
51. I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1) (1988) (emphasis added).
52. Note that the gift tax applies "whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether
the gift is direct or indirect, and whether the property is real or personal, tangible or
intangible." Id. § 2511(a).
53. Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306 (1945) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 708,
72d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1932); S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1932)).
54. Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 334 (1984) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 708,
72d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1932); S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1932)).
55. Id. at 330.
56. Id. at 332.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 335-36.
60. Id. at 336-37.
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effect, the lenders/parents were deemed to have charged a fair rate of
interest, the borrower/son was deemed to have paid this interest to
the lenders/parents, and the lenders/parents were then deemed to
have gratuitously transferred this interest back to the borrower/son.61
Therein lies the gift.
Unfortunately, the Court did not specifically limit its holding in
Dickman to situations involving interest-free demand loans. As argued
by the taxpayer in Dickman, a holding such as the Court's could have
the potential to create taxable gifts for any use of property including a
son's use of his parents' car, a grandparent's use of a bedroom in a
relative's home, and a neighbor's use of "a loan of the proverbial cup
of sugar."62 With a somewhat cavalier attitude, the majority addressed
the possible severe consequences of its holding by assuming that "the
focus of the Internal Revenue Service is not on such traditional famil-
ial matters."
63
When an adult daughter merely borrows her father's car to run
an errand, there is no rational argument that the use of the car should
subject this trivial transfer to a gift tax. Likewise, when an adult son
61. Id. at 335-36 n.5.
62. Id. at 340. See generally Mark j. Wolff, Dickman Confined: The Taxation of Gratuitous
Transfers of Use, 21 STETSON L. REv. 509 (1992) (analyzing a restricted view of Dickman v.
Commissioner in the context of the case's ancestry and progeny).
63. Dickman, 465 U.S. at 341. Now that more than 10 years have passed since Dickman,
it is arguable that the IRS has not acted as reasonably as the Court assumed it would in
limiting the Dickman holding. For instance, the Dickman rationale has been extended in
the area of asset freezes. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-23-007 (Feb. 18, 1987). The IRS has extended
Dickman on numerous occasions to grantor-retained income trusts (GRITs). Priv. Ltr. Rul.
88-01-008 (Oct. 7, 1987); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-05-029 (Nov. 9, 1987); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-06-082
(Nov. 18, 1987); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-15-005 (Jan. 7, 1988); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-23-029 (June 10,
1988); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-23-030 (June 10, 1988); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-44-008 (Nov. 4, 1988);
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-52-011 (Dec. 28, 1990); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-52-031 (Dec. 28, 1990); Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 91-09-027 (Mar. 1, 1991). In these cases, the IRS has stated that trusts funded with
unproductive or under-productive assets constitute both complete and partially incom-
plete gifts. The rationale is that a grantor-income beneficiary, by not exercising his rights
to require the trustee to invest in productive assets, makes an annual transfer to the
remainderman.
Additionally, the IRS has found that a parent who guarantees loans of a corporation of
which his children are shareholders has made a taxable gift. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-13-009 (Mar.
29, 1991). The IRSjustified this position by noting that a guarantee of payment is a valua-
ble economic benefit. Without the guarantee, the children may not have been able to get
a loan at all, or would have had to pay higher interest rates. Id. Even though the father
could call on the children for reimbursement in the event he was asked to make good on
the guarantee, the IRS deemed the transfer to be lacking in adequate consideration. Id.
See generally Valerie C. Robbins, Parent's Guarantee of Loan Results in a Gift, 22 TAx ADViSER
514 (1991) (discussing the extension of the Dickman rationale in treating certain indirect
transfers as gifts). Most recently, the IRS extended Dickman to a son's failure to exercise
his first right of refusal in the context of a buy-sell agreement with the father. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 91-17-035 (Apr. 26, 1991).
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pays a visit to his parents and sleeps in his old room, it hardly seems
reasonable that a taxable gift has occurred. Of course, while the Dick-
man rationale could technically be applied to these familial situations,
it would be a farcical application of the gift tax.
Is it, however, inappropriate to apply such "use of property" logic
to all familial situations? Suppose Mom and Dad own a small cottage
on the beach in Malibu, California, which for years has been rented
out to unrelated individuals. Beachfront property in Malibu com-
mands astronomical rents and the cottage, while very small, rents for
$8000 per month. Their adult son, unfortunately beset with personal
problems, is unemployed and financially troubled. Though not le-
gally obligated, the concerned and conscientious parents allow their
son to live in the cottage without remuneration.
Is this still a familial use of property without gift tax implication?
Or, has it been transformed into a taxable situation, where a valuable
property interest has been transferred-the measure of this interest
equal to the $8000 per month rent the parents have admirably fore-
gone? Would the analysis change if the parents had not previously
rented out the cottage but, rather, had used it only for vacations? Ac-
cording to the Court in Dickman, it was irrelevant whether or not the
property transferred for use by another was otherwise invested and
earned a return.' The Court's criteria for determining a taxable gift
were deemed to be fulfilled by the individual's conscious decision to
transfer a valuable property right-the gift then measured by the fair
value of the property's use.6"
Enter the questions that permeate the gift tax debacle: Is there a
gift once the parents make the conscious decision to allow their son to
live in the cottage rent-free (regardless of the cottage's past rental ac-
tivity)? Or, is the use of the property a nontaxable familial transaction
that is excluded (or, more accurately, not to be pursued by the IRS)
by the vague and undefined dicta of Dickman?66 No unqualified argu-
ment can be made that at a fair rental value of $8000 per month, or
64. Dickman, 465 U.S. at 340. In Dickman, the taxpayer asserted that the interest-free
loan should not be taxed based on the possibility that the money lent could instead have
been invested and produced income. Id. at 339-40. The Court, however, rejected this
rationale. It is true that "[a]n individual may, without incurring the gift tax, squander
money, conceal it under a mattress, or otherwise waste its use value by failing to invest it."
Id. at 340. Nevertheless, if the taxpayer decides to transfer the use of the money to another
rather than wasting it, the transfer is subject to the gift tax. Id. "That the transferor him-
self could have consumed or wasted the use value of the money without incurring the gift
tax does not change this result." Id.
65. Id. at 344. The Court determined the amount of the gift to be "the reasonable
value of the use of the money lent." Id.
66. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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$96,000 per year, a valuable property right has not been transferred.
Furthermore, if the two beach cottage scenarios above are indistin-
guishable for gift tax purposes, what then of the adult child being
allowed to live rent-free in a bedroom of the parent's house? When
viewed in isolation, this situation scarcely seems appropriate for an
application of the gift tax. However, in light of Dickman, what specific
factor circumscribes such conceivable events as nontaxable familial
situations?
The problematic effect of all this indefiniteness is that there is no
bright line test to determine what constitutes a transfer of property
that is a gift for gift tax purposes. While it is clear that Congress in-
tended the gift tax to reach those transactions made in an attempt to
avoid estate tax,67 exactly when a nontaxable familial transaction met-
amorphoses into a taxable gift is not as clear. As will be discussed in
the next section, support transfers (transfers made for the support of
another) are often plagued by uncertainty, inconformity, and non-
uniformity of gift tax application.
II. SUPPORT TRANSFERS AND THE GIFT TAX
The motivation behind most transfers for support stems not from
a desire to avoid the estate tax, but from an individual's sense of hu-
manity and decency. It is unlikely that Congress intended to tax those
transfers wherein the donor is merely giving the financial support that
is typically provided in a normal familial relationship.6" Even so, with-
out adequate consideration, support transfers are taxable gifts regard-
less of the donor's selfless intention.6' As previously discussed, a
transfer of property will be considered a gift for gift tax purposes if,
and to the extent, the transferor does not receive adequate considera-
tion in money or money's worth.7 ° Consideration such as love and
affection, while constituting legal consideration for contract pur-
poses, is totally disregarded in defining consideration for gift tax pur-
poses. 7' Given this criteria for determining valid consideration, the
next step in this journey through the gift tax labyrinth is to distinguish
67. Dickman, 465 U.S. at 338.
68. Note, Federal Tax Aspects of the Obligation to Support, 74 HIxv. L.REv. 1191, 1213
(1961).
69. See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
70. I.R.C. § 2512(b) (1988); see supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
71. Treas. Reg. § 25-2512-8 (as amended in 1992). The regulation states that "[a] con-
sideration not reducible to a value in money or money's worth, as love and affection, prom-
ise of marriage, etc., is to be wholly disregarded, and the entire value of the property
transferred constitutes the amount of the gift." Id.
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between nontaxable and taxable support transfers under the current
Internal Revenue Code.
A. Legal Versus Moral Obligation to Support-Nontaxable Versus Taxable
Gifts
Every state, either by statute or common law, imposes some obli-
gation to support certain individuals.7' Typical relationships that im-
pose some duty of support are parent and child (most commonly a
parent's duty to support minor children and, much less frequently, a
parent's duty to support an adult child or a child's duty to support a
parent), and husband and wife.7"
It is generally understood that a discharge of one's legal obliga-
tion to support constitutes, for gift tax purposes, valid consideration
in money or money's worth." Discharging one's obligation usually
involves the providing, in kind, of those items that constitute support.
Therefore, a parent providing shelter, food, and clothing for a minor
child (whom the parent has a legal duty to support) will be making
support transfers that are nontaxable under the federal gift tax. In
addition to in-kind support, payments such as divorce-related child
support can constitute the discharge of one's legal obligations,
thereby resulting in non-gift-tax transfers.7 5 However, the existence of
a legal obligation for support does not always rule out the implication
of gift tax. Taxable gifts may result when the value of property trans-
ferred exceeds the value of the donee's right to support.76
72. See infra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
73. See infra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
74. Note, Valuation of the Right to Support for Purposes of the Federal Tax System 72 COLUM.
L. REv. 132, 135 (1972). Interestingly, a proposed regulation, which was never adopted,
clearly stated that the discharge of a legal support obligation was not a taxable gift. Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(0(1), 22 Fed. Reg. 2 (1957). Nonetheless, because a monetary
value can be placed on a legally imposed support obligation, its discharge should consti-
tute consideration in money or money's worth. Krahmer, Gifts, 154-4th Tax Mgmt. (BNA),
at A-7 (1988). Commentators generally agree that
[t] his is one of the many areas in which estate and gift tax problems are analo-
gous and, even if the estate tax statute is more precise, like results should be
reached under both taxes. Thus, under § 2053, a decedent's obligations are de-
ductible; but if found on a promise, they are not, unless incurred for full consid-
eration in money or money's worth. Obligations imposed by law, however, are
deductible without regard to consideration. By analogy, lifetime transfers that
discharge obligations imposed by law are not subject to gift tax.
RicHARD B. STEPHENS ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIry TAXATION 10.02[5], at 10-51 n.84
(6th ed. 1991).
75. For divorce-related discharge of support obligations, see infra notes 97-105 and ac-
companying text.
76. See infra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
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The counterpart to the nontaxable transfers in discharge of a
legal support obligation, are transfers for another's support arising
solely out of a moral obligation, which are generally taxable. An ex-
ample of such a situation is that of a parent supporting an adult child,
which is common in practice but rarely an obligation pursuant to state
law.77 Although it seems that a mother's support of her handicapped
adult child should never result in gift tax liability, the fact of the mat-
ter is that unless that mother has a legal duty to support the adult
child,78 a taxable gift may transpire.7'
The key, therefore, to the application of a gift tax in support is-
sues is found in the answers to the following questions: when does an
individual have a legal (state-imposed) obligation to support; what is
the extent of such an obligation; and what are the tax ramifications
when the support that is provided exceeds the state-imposed legal
obligation?
B. When One Has a Legal Obligation to Support Another-General
Determination Under State Law
It is common knowledge, or more appropriately common behav-
ior, that parents provide support for their minor children. While pay-
ing exorbitant sums to buy the latest athletic shoes, only to have the
child's feet outgrow them long before the end of their useful life, may
not be a pleasant thought, it is typically accepted as part of one's pa-
rental duties. This, along with providing food, shelter, transportation,
education, and the like, makes up the customary financial burden of
supporting a child. If such support is being furnished pursuant to a
state-imposed obligation (a legal obligation), these types of transfers
77. See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
78. Of course, in some instances a state may impose a continuing duty of support with
respect to a handicapped child regardless of age. See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying
text.
79. While not plentiful, perhaps because of the lack of asking, there are incidences in
which the IRS has held that transfers by parents for the support of their adult handicapped
child are subject to gift tax (where there is no accompanying legal duty to support). See
Tech. Adv. Mem. 81-35-032 (Apr. 28, 1981) (finding that payments made during the dece-
dent's life to her adult handicapped children constituted taxable gifts); Gen. Couns. Mem.
38,702 (Apr. 28, 1981) (concurring with Tech. Adv. Mem. 81-35-032); see also Fisher v.
United States, 28 Cl. Ct. 88 (1993) (holding that because there is no legal duty to support
after emancipation under Washington law, transfers made from father to his adult handi-
capped son were subject to gift tax).
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are not in question as they are deemed to be for adequate and full
consideration, thus obviating a gift tax.80
Consistent with what is considered normal behavior, every state
imposes a duty upon parents to support a minor child. This univer-
sally recognized obligation is imposed either by common law or stat-
ute. 8' Food, shelter, clothing, medical attention, education, and the
like, are the core components of support.8 2
When a child reaches the age of majority, a parent's legal obliga-
tion for support generally ceases.8 3 Continued support for an adult
child, though arguably justifiable as a parental or moral duty, is gener-
ally not accompanied by a legal obligation. Absent a legal obligation
to act as consideration in money or money's worth, such support con-
stitutes a gift for gift tax purposes.84
Nonetheless, not every support issue involving an adult child
lacks the requisite legal obligation. The parental duty of support may
exist when a child is incapacitated or otherwise unable to care for
himself after reaching adulthood.85 Unfortunately, the imposition
and extent of such support obligations are not uniform among the
states.8 6 As state law is determinative of whether a legal obligation for
support exists, and this legal obligation is in turn determinative of a
80. "[A] transfer to one that the transferor has a legal obligation to support is for
adequate and full consideration and thus is not a taxable gift to the extent that the transfer
provides reasonable support." Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,702 (Apr. 28, 1981).
81. An in-depth discussion of state-imposed support obligations is beyond the scope of
this Article. For a general discussion of state-imposed support obligations, see 59 AM. JUR.
2D Parent and Child §§ 41-74 (1987).
82. For the extent of support and corresponding gift tax ramifications, see infra notes
90-95 and accompanying text.
83. For a general discussion, see Annotation, Parent's Obligation to Support Adult Child, I
A.L.R.2D 910, 912-14 (1993); see also 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child §§ 88, 89 (1987).
84. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
85. See Annotation, supra note 83, at 920, 935-39; see also Noralyn 0. Harlow, Annota-
tion, Postmajority Disability as Reviving Parental Duty to Support Child, 48 A.L.R.4TH 919 (1993)
(noting that some states impose a support obligation only if child is disabled upon reach-
ing majority but not if child becomes disabled subsequent to reaching majority); 59 AM.
JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 90 (1987). For a Treasury determination on this issue, see Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 77-280-03 (Mar. 31, 1977) (finding that under Maryland law, "parents are liable
for the support of incompetent adult children, as well as for the support of minor
children").
86. See Annotation, supra note 83, at 920, 934-39; 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 90
(1987). See generally Lee E. Teitelbaum, Intergenerational Responsibility and Family Obligation:
On Sharing, 1992 UTAH L. REv. 765, 789-91 (discussing differing support obligations among
the states); Harlow, supra note 85, at 934-44 (noting cases); David Beck & Sheldon V.
Ekman, Where Does Support End and Taxable Gift Begin?, 23 N.Y.U. INsT. ON FED. TAX'N 1181,
1184 (1965) (discussing the differing state standards for parental support of children).
19961
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
gift for gift tax purposes, there is, in effect, an inconsistent application
of federal gift tax laws among the states.8 7
Similar to a parent's support of an adult child, it is universally
accepted that there is no general legal obligation for a child to sup-
port a parent. Only in certain jurisdictions and in very limited situa-
tions (for example, in the case of certain "indigent" parents) is there a
state-imposed duty to support a parent."8 Adding to the uncertainty
of the law, a few states may require the support of certain relatives
outside the immediate family.8 9 The result of this inconformity in the
law is disconcerting. A caring son in one state may be insulated from
federal gift taxes because the support provided to an aging mother is
mandated by state statute, while support for a parent by an equally
caring daughter in another state represents a taxable gift because
there is no legal duty of support.
C. Extent of Support Obligation
Thus far, we have seen that the satisfaction of a legal duty to sup-
port is deemed adequate consideration in money or money's worth so
87. Confusion about the role a state's notion of legal obligation plays in determining
federal gift tax is illustrated by Commissioner v. Greene, 119 F.2d 383 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 314 U.S. 641 (1941). The Greene court addressed the issue of whether support pay-
ments made pursuant to state law constitute taxable gifts, reasoning that "[t]he only thing
in question here is the 'consideration.' Nothing in the act expressly states that the exist-
ence of consideration is to be determined by state law." Id. at 385. Thus, the court found
that the taxpayer had made a taxable gift despite the taxpayer's legal obligation to support
under state law. Id.
The Greene decision, however, has been criticized and generally is not thought to be a
valid interpretation of support-based consideration for gift tax purposes. See STEPHENS ET
AL., supra note 74, at 10-52. For example, the IRS consistently determines valid considera-
tion in discharge of legal support obligations based upon state laws. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul.
81-35-032 (June 1, 1981) ("The existence of a legally enforceable obligation to support
must be determined with reference to local law."); see also Rev. Rul. 73-612, 1973-2 C.B. 322
(discussing "[playments from incapacitated ward's estate under Florida law").
88. For good discussion of the issue, see Ann Britton, America's Best Kept Secret: An Adult
Child's Duty to Support Aged Parents, 26 CAL. W. L. REv. 351 (1989-90). See also 59 AM. JUR. 2D
Parent and Child § 91 (1987); Note, supra note 68, at 1193. The California Civil Code pro-
vides that it is the duty of "the children of any person in need who is unable to maintain
himself by work, to maintain such person to the extent of their ability." CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 206 (West 1982). Both the California court and the Treasury Department have disre-
garded Greene and applied the plain meaning of the law. See, e.g., Swoap v. Superior Court,
516 P.2d 840, 848 (Cal. 1973) (finding that "[i]t is abundantly clear that children have
generally been subject to a duty to support poor parents for a very long time, indeed");
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 82-25-091 (Mar. 25, 1982) (stating that "to the extent that current income of
the trust is applied in satisfaction of the donor's legal obligation to support or maintain his
parents there is no gift").
89. Note, supra note 68, at 1193. For an examination of intrafamily support responsi-
bilities, see Teitelbaum, supra note 86, passim.
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as to not constitute a gift subject to gift tax. Providing transportation
for one's minor child clearly fits within the auspices of such support.
What of the parent who, on the occasion of a daughter's sixteenth
birthday, presents her with a Ferrari automobile wrapped with a big
bow? This is, of course, transportation and the parent's state-deter-
mined obligation to support a minor child does encompass the duty
to provide transportation. If it is the support obligation under state
law that determines the existence of consideration, then it follows that
property transferred must be analyzed in relation to the extent of
such obligation to support. Discharge of a support obligation shall be
deemed adequate consideration only to the extent that the law re-
quires such obligation. Support provided in excess of what is required
under state law (even though required to some degree with respect to
a particular individual) is not in exchange for consideration in money
or money's worth. Therefore, it is a gift for gift tax purposes.90
If one has a state-determined obligation of support for another, is
there a particular level of support that one is typically required to pro-
vide? The most general definition of the duty to support requires the
furnishing of such support that is "determined ... by the means, abil-
ity, social position and circumstances both of the particular [obligor]
and his [obligee]."9' Such support is usually limited to providing the
necessaries of life to the recipient.9" Necessaries obviously exclude
extravagant purchases or luxuries above and beyond a person's nor-
mal living needs.93 Yet once again no exact standard exists to gauge
the scope of these necessaries, and, as a result, court decisions lack
uniformity in this area.94
90. See generally Beck & Ekman, supra note 86, at 1188-1202 (discussing obligations to
support pursuant to gift tax law).
91. State v. Moran, 121 A. 277, 279 (Conn. 1923). California courts have found that a
"[plarent's support obligation does not end when furnishing mere necessaries, for the
minor is entitled to be maintained in a style and condition consonant with his parents'
financial ability and position in society." In re Ricky H., 468 P.2d 204, 208 (1970); see also
Entrekin v. Entrekin, 627 So. 2d 955, 956 (1993) (interpreting Alabama law to include
postminority support based upon the reasonable necessaries of the child's college ex-
penses); Kennedy v. Sniffen, 23 Haw. 115, 118 (1916) (requiring reimbursement of neces-
saries based on the child's "station in life).
92. Beck & Ekman, supra note 86, at 1185.
93. Bergh v. Warner, 50 N.W. 77, 78 (Minn. 1891) (holding that diamond earrings are
outside the scope of "necessaries" when determining the extent of the support obligation).
Some specific examples of necessaries include food and lodging, but not room and board
at a beach hotel for the summer. Stevens v. Hush, 176 N.Y.S. 602, 605 (N.Y. App. Term
1919). Also, clothing and medical expenses are obviously deemed necessaries. Moran, 121
A. at 279. In terms of the obligation of support under state law, the standard as to the
extent of support required is usually phrased as "station of life" or "standard of living." Id.
94. Beck & Ekman, supra note 86, at 1186.
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If decisions lack uniformity in this area, then so does the possible
application of the federal gift tax. This is the paradox of the suppos-
edly equal and uniform federal tax law that Congress has yet to ad-
dress. For even if the determination of a taxable transfer is to remain
as vague as the approach used in Dickman v. Commissioner,95 the same
ill-defined determination should be equally applied throughout the
states.
D. Support in Connection with a Marriage Dissolution
In the context of a marriage dissolution, spousal and child sup-
port are transfers that can generate gift tax questions. Historically,
the gift tax status of divorce-related support transfers, at least with re-
spect to spousal support, was shrouded in confusion. In some in-
stances, such transfers were considered made for adequate
consideration in money or money's worth, while in other situations
that were hardly distinguishable, gift tax resulted.96 In order to pro-
vide some relief for divorcing couples, at least two exceptions have
been carved out in which transfers of property are treated as if they
occurred with adequate consideration.9 7
The statutory exception is found at I.R.C. § 2516. This section
provides an exemption from the gift tax for transfers of property, pur-
suant to a written instrument, within three years of divorce beginning
one year before such an agreement was entered into.9" If these re-
quirements are met, the transaction is deemed to have been made
95. 450 U.S. 330 (1984); see supra notes 55-67 and accompanying text.
96. Compare E.T. 19, 1946-2 C.B. 166 (finding that transfers incident to separation
agreement in exchange for support rights were made for adequate consideration, but gifts
resulted to the extent transfers were in exchange for release of dower, curtesy, or other
such rights) and Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945) (holding that a transfer of property in
exchange for a release of dower and curtesy rights-but not support rights-pursuant to
antenuptial agreement was considered a gift) with Mitchell v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 159
(1946) (holding that transfers pursuant to a separation agreement in exchange for dower/
curtesy or support rights were not gifts).
97. See generally Schlissel & Skarlatos, supra note 27, at 81-92.
98. I.R.C. § 2516 (1988). This section creates a statutory exception from gift tax as
follows:
Where husband and wife enter into a written agreement relative to their marital
and property rights and divorce occurs within the 3-year period beginning on the
date 1 year before such agreement is entered into (whether or not such agree-
ment is approved by the divorce decree), any transfers of property or interests in
property made pursuant to such agreement -
(1) to either spouse in settlement of his or her marital or property rights, or
(2) to provide a reasonable allowance for the support of issue of the mar-
riage during minority, shall be deemed to be transfers made for a full and ade-
quate consideration in money or money's worth.
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"for full and adequate consideration," and no gift tax liability results.99
The scope of this section covers transfers to the other spouse in settle-
ment of his or her property rights,100 and a reasonable allowance for
the support of any children of the marriage during their minority."1
This statutory provision adds little, however, with respect to gift taxa-
tion of child support payments because of its application only to mi-
nor children, for whom such support is free from gift tax even in
absence of this section.
The second scenario in which a transfer is deemed to have ade-
quate consideration in divorce transactions was carved out in Harris v.
Commissioner. 1 2 In Harris, the Court held that, in certain circum-
stances, property transfers pursuant to a divorce-related separation
agreement do not constitute taxable gifts. The promise in the separa-
tion agreement did not itself constitute valid consideration for gift tax
purposes, the Court reasoned, and because the transfer was "effected
by court decree, no 'promise or agreement' of the parties" resulted.10 3
Nevertheless, because payments pursuant to a divorce are not actually
voluntary property agreements between the parties (which would be
subject to gift tax) a transfer made pursuant to a court order, or a
separation agreement that is subject to court redetermination, escapes
gift tax liability. 10 4 In other words, the court order creates a legal obli-
gation where one otherwise did not exist, and this legal obligation
qualifies as adequate consideration. This is consistent with the gift tax
purpose of preventing the tax-free diminution of one's estate through
inter vivos transfers, a motivation that is clearly not present with these
types of transfers. To illustrate, if the state imposes a legal duty to
support one's minor children, a property transfer or the creation of a
trust for that child "'hardly depletes the transferor's estate any more
so than would the furnishing of support for a minor child living with
99. Id.
100. Id. § 2516(1).
101. Id. § 2516(2) (emphasis added).
102. 340 U.S. 106 (1950).
103. Id. at 111-12.
104. Schlissel & Skarlatos, supra note 27, at 89-90. Note, however, that payments made
by the representative of an incompetent person pursuant to a court order may be subject to
the gift tax. This seems contrary to the Harris opinion, but in fact this situation is distin-
guishable. Although the transfers are not voluntary, there is no legal duty to support in
these situations. The court simply sees that a relative to the incompetent individual is in
need and presupposes that the incompetent would have helped his relative if he had
proper capacity to do so. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 67-280, 1967-2 C.B. 349 (holding that moneys
paid by the committee of an incompetent person to his relatives without consideration are
subject to gift tax); Rev. Rul. 73-612, 1973-2 C.B. 322 (finding payments made by guardian
from estate of incapacitated ward to a nondependent are subject to gift tax).
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the parent."" 5 The real issue, however, is whether this Harris excep-
tion, which actually predates I.R.C. § 2516,106 enlarges the scope of
nonvoluntary tax-free transfers to include the rare occurrence of sup-
port payments to adult children pursuant to a divorce decree. While
some argue that such payments are veiled in a nonvoluntary cloak
and, therefore, are nontaxable,"°7 the better view is that notwithstand-
ing the nonvoluntary aspect of such transfers, a tax-free support obli-
gation cannot eclipse that for which the transferor is liable under state
law."0 ' If this is the case, the Harris exception, like I.R.C. § 2516, adds
little to existing law with respect to gift taxation of child support
payments.
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAw-AN ETHICAL DILEMMA FOR
TAx ADVISORS
The current state of the law regarding transfers for the support of
another leaves the tax advisor in an ethical bind. Clearly the Internal
Revenue Code requires that gifts of money or tangible property that
are made for the benefit of another should be reflected by the donor
as a gift subject to gift tax. With almost as much clarity, albeit with a
distinct sense of unfairness and with little knowledge even among the
educated public, transfers for the support of another made out of a
moral, but not legal, duty also constitute gifts subject to gift tax. The
water takes on some turbidity, however, regarding the implication of
the gift tax to those common familial transfers of property that involve
only the use of property: for example, the uncompensated use of a
parent's automobile by an adult child or the elderly mother who is
105. Schlissel & Skarlatos, supra note 27, at 88 (quoting WILLIAM J. BROWN, 1 DIVORCE
AND TAX PLANNING STRATEGIES § 13.09, at 13-10 (1992)).
106. Harris was decided in 1950 and I.RC. § 2516 was enacted in 1954. Although § 2516
was enacted to bring some degree of certainty to the area, "it is well to observe that Section
2516 does not purport to be exclusive, and a divorce transfer that is not exempt under this
section may still escape tax under general gift tax principles." STEPHENS ET AL., supra note
74, at 10-79 (citing Michel G. Emmanuel, Property Settlements: Ante-Nuptia4 During Marriage,
at Termination, 24 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 281 (1966)).
107. Hesch, Divorce and Separation, 95-5th Tax Mgmt. (BNA), at A-17 (1988).
108. Weidmann v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 565, 569 (1956) (holding that value of re-
mainder interest transferred to adult daughter pursuant to a divorce decree was a taxable
gift); Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 505, 508 (2d Cir. 1953) ("We do not find this
[Harris] rationale applicable to a decree ordering payments to adult offspring.... ."); Gen.
Couns. Mem. 37,397 (Jan. 30, 1978) ("In addition, the mere fact that the promise or court
order to provide for children may be enforceable by then [sic] does not necessarily mean
that it is based on adequate consideration .... " (citations omitted)); see also Rev. Rul. 67-
280, 1967-2 C.B. 349. From a public policy standpoint, it would hardly seem appropriate to
impose gift tax on voluntary transfers to an adult child for support made pursuant to a
moral obligation, but have nonvoluntary, court-ordered, support transfers escape tax.
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provided rent-free accommodations in her child's house or in a dwell-
ing owned by the child. More specifically, the Court's interpretation
of I.R.C. § 2501 in Dickman v. Commissioner09 did not decide the ques-
tion of what common transfers must be reported as taxable gifts.
It is clear from the Code that nonsupport transfers of property or
money that are made directly to another represent a gift subject to gift
tax, and therefore the advisor must indicate such to the client. But
what happens when the client begins to inform the advisor about pay-
ments made in direct support of another-a person whom the trans-
feror/client has no legal obligation to support? The client begins to
speak about money paid to an adult child in college, or money and
property transferred to an aging parent. Does the advisor politely in-
terrupt and say, "Before you tell me anything more about your situa-
tion, let me tell you about the gift tax rules. Did you know that
transfers of money or property to another for that person's support
may result in gift tax liability to the donor when there is no legal duty
to support that person? Now that you know the rules, do you really
want to divulge this information?" If the client insists on continuing,
does the advisor insist that the client file gift tax returns if neces-
sary?11 ° Or does the advisor tell the client that, as ridiculous as it
sounds, these support-type transfers are actually gifts subject to gift
tax, but nevertheless the client would be a fool to report them as such
because nobody else does and the IRS does not seem to be aggres-
sively pursuing such transactions?
What of situations where the client merely allows an adult child
or parent to live rent-free in the client's beach house, or exclusively
use a car owned by the client. Recall that in Dickman, the Court said
that a decision to treat an interest-free loan as a gift of property (the
use of the property measured by the interest not charged) would give
rise to the application of the gift tax when family members are pro-
vided with rent-free use of property.1" The Court, while recognizing
that it is common for parents to provide their adult children with such
109. 465 U.S. 330 (1984); see discussion supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
110. A gift tax return must be filed by April 15 following the calendar year in which the
gift was made. I.R.C. § 6075 (1988). This is necessary only when the gift exceeds the
$10,000 per donee annual exclusion. See supra note 33.
111. Dickman, 465 U.S. at 336-37. The petitioners argued that when carrying the Court's
rationale for taxing interest-free demand loans to its logical extreme, such "commonplace
transactions as a loan of the proverbial cup of sugar to a neighbor or loan of lunch money
to a colleague" would technically become transfers subject to the gift tax. Id. at 341.
Although the majority brushed over this contention, the dissent noted that the potential
scope of the opinion was its most troublesome feature. Id. at 349 (Powell, J., dissenting).
By not limiting the holding to interest-free loans, "the rent-free use of a home by a child
over the age of minority who lives with his parents, or by a parent over the age of self-
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things as the use of a car, "assumed" that "the focus of the Internal
Revenue Service is not on such traditional familial matters.""' 2 Unfor-
tunately, this assumption provides little guidance to the attorney who
must advise the client. Should a client be told, "Don't report it and we
will keep our fingers crossed that you don't get audited?" How would
such behavior affect our tax system, which relies, primarily, on self-
assessment? The uncertainty created by Dickman draws a fine line be-
tween sound legal advice and a breach of the ethical duties owed by
the tax advisor." l3
In all areas of advice, tax included, the advising attorney must
protect the client's best interests and at the same time live up to the
obligations imposed upon the legal profession. Obligations imposed
upon the attorney when advising a client emanate from two major
sources: the federal tax statutes, and federal and state rules of profes-
sional ethics.
A. Statutory Obligations Imposed on Advisors to Ensure Tax Compliance
The Internal Revenue Code imposes duties on attorneys and
their clients to ensure compliance with the tax laws. First, I.R.C.
§ 6662 includes a penalty for negligence and disregard of the tax rules
and regulations.1'4 Although this accuracy-related penalty imposes a
duty on the taxpayer, it also indirectly imposes a duty on the tax advi-
sor because a lawyer's obligation flows from the client's responsibility
to comply with the law." 5 Under I.R.C. § 6662, negligence includes
any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply with the revenue
laws or to exercise ordinary and reasonable care in the preparation of
a tax return.' 16 In determining negligence, courts usually apply the
"reasonably prudent" test, which requires that the taxpayer has a rea-
support who lives with her child" becomes a transfer subject to possible tax liability. Id. at
350.
The dissent also acknowledged the valuation problem created by the possibility of
taxation in these situations. Id. "It is often difficult to place a value on outright ownership
of property. Those difficulties multiply when the interest to be valued is the use of the
property for varying lengths of time." Id.
112. Id. at 341. The dissent recognized that "[t]his assumption is not likely to afford
much comfort to taxpayers and the lawyers and accountants who advise them." Id. at 351.
113. Jean T. Adams, Reconciling Family Law with Tax Policy: Untangling the Tax Treatment
of Parental Trusts, 46 TAX L. REV. 107, 108 (1990). The rules for advising clients in this area
"seem to turn on formal distinctions, inviting manipulation of the tax outcome through
artful drafting of trust instruments and separation agreements." Id.
114. I.R.C. § 6662 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Any violation of § 6662 results in a penalty to
the taxpayer of 20% of the portion of the underpayment. Id. § 6662 (a).
115. J. Timothy Philipps, It's Not Easy Being Easy: Advising Tax Return Positions, 50 WAsH.
& LEE L. REv. 589, 598 (1993).
116. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(1) (1995).
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sonable basis for a position taken on the tax return.' 17 As long as the
return position is arguable, it may satisfy the reasonably prudent re-
quirement even if it is not likely to prevail in court.' A ten- to
twenty-percent chance of success if litigated probably satisfies the rea-
sonable basis standard." 9 In simple terms, the negligence penalty can
be avoided if the taxpayer provides a reasonable basis for the tax posi-
tion taken. The penalty also may be avoided if the taxpayer makes
adequate disclosure of the position taken on the return.1 20 Clearly,
under existing law, the negligence penalty would attach to the nonre-
porting of direct transfers of money or property for an adult child's or
parent's support. With respect to support-type use of property by an-
other, however, the answer is not as clear. Conceivably, advising the
client to clearly disclose the use of any property for the support of
another may force the IRS's hand to pursue a gift tax liability, notwith-
standing the Supreme Court's assumption to the contrary.
The second possible taxpayer penalty imposed by the Internal
Revenue Code occurs when there is any substantial understatement
on the tax return.1 21 Section 6662(b) (5) specifically addresses trans-
fers for the support of another by declaring a penalty for "[a]ny sub-
stantial estate or gift tax valuation understatement."1 22 The Code
defines "substantial valuation understatement" for the estate and gift
tax as transfers where "the value of any property claimed on any re-
turn of tax imposed . . . is 50 percent or less of the amount deter-
mined to be the correct amount of such valuation." 12  Therefore, if
the taxpayer does not report the support transfers, or reports them in
an amount less than fair market value, he may be in violation of this
section. As a result of these penalties imposed on individuals, if the
IRS determines that the taxpayer made taxable gifts when he trans-
ferred property (or allowed the use of such property) for the support
117. Philipps, supra note 115, at 599 (citing a number of cases in which courts applied
the "reasonably prudent" test, e.g., Heasley v. Commissioner, 967 F.2d 116, 120-21 (5th Cir.
1992); Sammons v. Commissioner, 838 F.2d 330, 337 (9th Cir. 1988); Marcello v. Commis-
sioner, 380 F.2d 499, 506 (5th Cir. 1967)).
118. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2) (1995).
119. Sheldon Banoff & Harvey Coustan, Final Regulations on Return Preparer Penalties: IRS
Refuses to Deal, Preparers'Fears Prove to Be Real/Penalty Roulette--Roll the Wheel/Who Knows How
the Courts Will Fee4 70 TAxFs 137, 175 (1992).
120. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-(3)(c) (1991).
121. I.R.C. § 6662(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). As with the penalty for negligence, 20%
of the amount underpaid is added to the tax owed. Id. § 6662(a).
122. Id. § 6662(b) (5).
123. Id. § 6 662(g)(1). The Code also provides that if the misstatement of valuation is
"gross," the penalty may increase from 20% of the underpayment to 40% of the underpay-
ment. Id. §6662(h)(1).
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of another, the taxpayer may be liable for both negligence in not com-
plying with the tax laws, and for substantial understatements on his
tax return.
The Internal Revenue Code also imposes an obligation directly
on the tax advisor. Section 6694 provides that any understatement of
liability that is due to a position that lacks a realistic possibility of be-
ing sustained on its merits will result in a $250 fine on the tax advi-
sor.1 24 A realistic possibility of success exists if "a reasonable and well-
informed analysis would lead a person knowledgeable in the tax law to
conclude that the position has approximately a one-in-three, or
greater, likelihood of being sustained on its merits." ' 5 Specifically
regarding the Dickman "use of property" type situations,1 2 6 a tax advi-
sor clearly can make an argument that there is a greater than one-in-
three chance that the IRS will not challenge traditional familial trans-
fers for support. However, if the IRS does challenge such transfers for
support, the Code specifically requires a one-in-three chance that the
position will be sustained on its merits. Because familial transactions
such as the use of a parent's car by an adult son are technically gratui-
tous transfers of property as set forth by the holding in Dickman, the
tax advisor may have trouble arguing successfully on the merits when
these types of transfers have been excluded from the tax return. This
is exactly the "lack of comfort position" for advisors that the dissent
predicted in Dickman.127
124. Id. § 6694(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1994). The Code reads as follows:
(a) Understatements due to unrealistic positions. -If-
(1) any part of any understatement of liability with respect to any return or
claim for refund is due to a position for which there was not a realistic possibility
of being sustained on its merits,
(2) any person who is an income tax return preparer with respect to such
return or claim knew (or reasonably should have known) of such position, and
(3) such position was not disclosed .. . or was frivolous, such person shall
pay a penalty of $250 with respect to such return or claim unless it is shown that
there is reasonable cause for the understatement and such person acted in good
faith.
I.R.C. § 6694(a) (1)-(3). Additionally, if the understatement of liability is due to a "willful
attempt in any manner to understate," or to "any reckless or intentional disregard of
rules," the penalty is increased from $250 to $1000. Id. § 6694(b)(1)-(2).
A $1000 penalty for "aiding and abetting" in the understatement of tax might also
have implication to an advisor. See id. § 6701 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
125. Philipps, supra note 115, at 608.
126. Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 336-38 (1984); see supra notes 55-63 and
accompanying text.
127. The dissent in Dickman noted that the assumption that the IRS will not pursue such
transfers is "not likely to afford much comfort to taxpayers and the lawyers and accountants
who advise them." 465 U.S. at 351 (Powell, J., dissenting). "In short, the net result of the
Court's decision will be to create potential tax liability for many taxpayers who have never
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B. Professional Obligations-Rules of Ethics for Attorneys
In addition to the penalties set forth in the Internal Revenue
Code, tax practitioners are also subject to state and federal ethics rules
and to discipline thereunder." 8 Although courts adopt varying ethi-
cal rules,12 9 the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct' and the Treasury Department's Circular 230 13 have
become the unifying standards for tax practice.
Under the Model Rules, the attorney "may advise reporting a po-
sition on a return even where the lawyer believes the position proba-
bly will not prevail, there is no 'substantial authority' in support of the
position, and there will be no disclosure of the position in the re-
turn."1 3 2 However, a requirement of good faith is imposed on the
advisor so that "there must be some realistic possibility of success if the
matter is litigated."13 3 This standard contemplates a likelihood of suc-
cess of around one-third in order to qualify as a realistic possibility.1 3 4
Circular 230 mandates that the practitioner exercise "due dili-
gence" in preparing and filing returns and other documents with the
IRS.135 This standard is met if there is a "reasonable basis" for the
position.' 36 Therefore, if the transfers for support satisfy the require-
ments of Formal Opinion 85-352 of the Model Rules, the Circular 230
standard also will be met.
When applying these professional standards to familial gifts such
as allowing an adult child or relative to use a second home, car, air-
plane, boat, or other property rent-free, the issue becomes whether an
effective argument can be made for a gift tax not being assessed. In
been subject to it before, and create legal, tax accounting, and return filing nightmares for
many others." Id. at 352.
128. Steven C. Salch, Tax Practice Ethics: Practitioner Discipline and Sanctions, C889 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 285, 288 (1993).
129. Id. The majority of state courts, the Tax Court, and the Claims Court use the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct or the predecessor ABA Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility as their ethical standard. The federal district courts and courts of appeals generally
use either the state's ethics codes, the Model Rules, or a combination of the two. Id. at 288-
89.
130. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL. CONDUCT (1983).
131. 31 C.F.R § 10.34 (1995).
132. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985),
7printed in 39 TAX LAW. 631, 633 (1986).
133. Id. at 634.
134. Report of the Special Task Force on Formal Opinion 85-352, reprinted in 39 TAX LAw. 635
(1986). The Task Force found that "[a] position having only a 5% or 10% likelihood of
success, if litigated, should not meet the new standard. A position having a likelihood of
success closely approaching one-third should meet the new standard." Id. at 638-39.
135. 31 C.F.R. § 10.34 (1995); see also Philipps, supra note 115, at 618.
136. Philipps, supra note 115, at 618.
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Dickman v. Commissioner,137 the Court used the plain-meaning ap-
proach and held that Congress intended "the gift tax statute [§ 2501]
to reach all gratuitous transfers of any valuable interest in prop-
erty." 1 38 Even though the Court assumed that Congress would not en-
force the statute toward commonplace familial transactions, there is
no authority that the advisor may rely on to warrant belief in a one-in-
three likelihood of success on the merits after excluding such trans-
fers from the tax return. If the Court is consistent in applying the
plain meaning of the statute, the language of I.R.C. § 2501 clearly en-
compasses the use of a home, the use of a car, and the use of the
"proverbial cup of sugar."13 9
On the other side of the coin, the tax advisor has an obligation to
protect the client's best interests, not to mention the advisor's own
moral obligation as a human being. (Unthinkable as it may seem, tax
advisors are people too!) Can an advisor fulfill such obligations by
looking a client in the eye and telling him he must pay a gift tax for
providing his elderly parent with shelter, food, and clothing? Such
advice discourages families from taking care of one another, which is
clearly against public policy. Advising a client to report such transfers
also results in an extra financial burden for the taxpayer who may be
scraping together pennies just to provide support for the extra family
member. If the Court can assume that the IRS will not focus on certain
types of familial transactions, perhaps it is not too much to ask the IRS
to provide an exclusion from gift tax for transfers for the support of
another.
IV. TRANSFER-FOR-CONSUMPTION EXCLUSION-A MODEL FOR REFORM
Subjecting transfers for the support of others to a gift tax violates
the core principles of human compassion and does not promote the
general policy underlying the imposition of a gift tax.14° In the gift
tax arena, discharging one's moral obligation to support another
should not be of any less weight than fulfilling one's legal support
obligations. In addition, gift tax liability and the imposition of penal-
ties should not depend upon the IRS's presumed policy of not enforc-
ing the law on certain common familial transfers."' Presently,
137. 465 U.S. 330 (1984).
138. Id. at 334 (emphasis added).
139. Id.
140. Again, the general purpose for the gift tax is to prevent individuals from intention-
ally diminishing their estates through inter vivos transfers in order to escape estate tax
liability. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
141. See Ray, supra note 13, at 426-27.
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transfers for the benefit of persons dependent on the transferor are
taxable to the extent they exceed the annual exclusion and are not in
discharge of one's legal obligation.142 Nonetheless, it is difficult for a
taxpayer to understand why support given to a public charity results in
zero tax liability 4' while support given to a needy friend or relative is
subject to a gift tax. In fact, most transferors simply do not regard
payments for clothing, food, and shelter to their loved ones as taxable
gifts. 1" Perhaps as a result, not only has the IRS apparently taken a
position of nonenforcement, but the public itself has unknowingly
taken a position of noncompliance. 145
It is time to reexamine the purpose of the gift tax and its applica-
tion to transfers for support. The purpose of the gift tax, to act as a
backstop to the estate tax," is not in harmony with the motivation
behind transfers made for another's support. In 1981 Congress took a
step in the right direction by enacting gift tax exclusions for certain
support-related transfers. Unfortunately, these provisions do not ade-
quately deal with the transfer-for-support issue. Following is a discus-
sion of these provisions and a proposal for a more thorough solution.
A. A Step in the Right Direction-The Existing Educational and Medical
Expense Exclusion
In 1981 Congress responded to the injustice of taxing certain pay-
ments for support by providing an unlimited exclusion for certain
medical and educational expenses paid for the benefit of another.
Section 2503(e) reads as follows:
(1) In general
Any qualified transfer shall not be treated as a transfer
of property by gift for purposes of this chapter.
(2) Qualified transfer
142. Harry L. Gutman, A Comment on the ABA Tax Section Task Force Report on Transfer Tax
Restructuring, 41 TAX LAW. 653, 660 (1988); see also supra notes 33, 74-76 and accompanying
text (discussing transfers to dependent transferees).
143. In computing taxable gifts for the calendar year, § 2522 allows a deduction for
transfers made to charitable organizations regardless of the amount. I.R.C. § 2522(a)
(1988). Similarly, when determining estate tax liability, a deceased individual's bequests of
property to charity are deducted from the gross estate. Id. § 2055(a). In addition to these
deductions from the estate and gift tax, the transferor also receives an income tax benefit,
subject to limitations. Id. § 170(a), (b) (1) (A)-(B).
144. Gutman, supra note 142, at 660.
145. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 24-27.
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For purposes of this subsection, the term "qualified
transfer" means any amount paid on behalf of an individ-
ual-
(A) as tuition to an educational organization
for the education or training of such individual, or
(B) to any person who provides medical care ...
with respect to such individual as payment for such medical
care. 1
47
This exclusion is available for payments made on behalf of any indi-
vidual, regardless of his relationship to the transferor, as long as the
payment is made directly to the provider of the services.14 8 The exclu-
sion is in addition to the $10,000 annual gift tax exclusion. 9 To
qualify for the educational and medical exclusion, the support can
only be for direct medical expenses 5 ' and tuition; hence the cost of
books, supplies, board, and meals while attending school does not
qualify under section 2503(e).' 5 '
Clearly, enactment of I.R.C. § 2503(e) indicates some recognition
by Congress that certain transfers should not fall within the scope of
the gift tax. The two items impacted by the statute, education and
medical costs, are among those typically included within the spectrum
of support-related expenditures. The fact that this gift exclusion ap-
plies notwithstanding any legally imposed obligation of support indi-
cates that many support-type transfers are now free from gift tax.
Payments for an adult child's education still lack consideration in
money or money's worth, but as long as these payments are made di-
rectly to an institution for the requisite tuition and fees, they will be
147. I.R.C. § 2503(e) (1988).
148. Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-6 (1984). The regulation specifically states that if the trans-
feror reimburses the individual in need of support rather than making payments directly to
the provider of the services, the payments do not qualify under the exclusion. Id.
§ 25.2503-6(c), ex. 4. In applying § 2503(e), the IRS addressed a situation in which an
adult child was seriously injured in an automobile accident. Rev. Rul. 82-98, 1982-1 C.B.
141. While the child was incapacitated, his father paid his medical expenses directly to the
hospital, and also made monthly mortgage payments on the adult child's house. Id. The
IRS allowed an exclusion for the medical expenses because they were paid directly to the
hospital, but disallowed any exclusion for the mortgage payments because they did not fall
under § 2503(e). Id.
149. Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-6(a). The $10,000 annual exclusion from the gift tax for
each donee is provided in I.R.C. § 2503(b). See supra note 33.
150. Qualifying medical expenses are defined in § 213(d) and include "expenses in-
curred for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease." Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2503-6(b)(3). In addition, the exclusion covers payments made for medical insurance
on behalf of any individual. Id. However, amounts paid for medical care that are reim-
bursed by the donee's insurance are not excluded from taxable income. Id.
151. Id. § 25.2503-6(b) (2). The unlimited exclusion only applies to tuition for full-time
or part-time students paid directly to the educational institution. Id.
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excluded from becoming taxable gifts via I.R.C. § 2503(e) .152 Simi-
larly, qualifying medical payments made on behalf of another escape
the wrath of the gift tax.
1 53
Although I.R.C. § 2503(e) excludes from the gift tax many typical
transfers made for the support of another, it falls short of providing
an all-encompassing solution to the problem. Section 2503(e), by de-
fault, acknowledges the taxability of transfers that fall outside the
listed exceptions, such as support other than educational and medical
expenses not required under local law (for example, support of an
adult child). Still vulnerable are those support-type transfers made to,
or for, the benefit of a nondependent adult child or parent. For ex-
ample, general living, transportation, and nonqualifying educational
or medical payments are among those types of transfers that may still
subject the transferor to gift taxes.
If the purpose of I.R.C. § 2503(e) is to exclude expenditures for
support and address the problem of nonenforcement and noncompli-
ance, restricting the exclusion to tuition and direct medical expenses
leaves much to be desired. 154 The rationale for the unlimited educa-
tional and medical expense exclusion for nondependents should logi-
cally extend to other payments for support of nondependents. 155
B. The Need to Go Further-The Transfer-for-Consumption Exclusion
Proposal
This Article proposes that transfers for the support of another
individual, arising from one's legal or moral sense of obligation,
should not subject the transferor to gift tax. Accomplishing a desira-
ble societal objective (or perhaps more appropriately, not penalizing
socially desirable behavior) through tax legislation can be a daunting
task. No tax provision has such a "bright line" as to not create
problems with interpretation or enforcement. Nevertheless, a worka-
ble proposal for excluding support-type transfers does exist.
In 1969 the American Law Institute (ALI) proposed an exclusion
for transfers made for another's consumption, and in 1977 the ALI
recommended that such an exclusion be included in the then-current
152. Id. § 25.2503-6(c), ex. 1.
153. Id. § 25.2503-6(c), ex. 3.
154. Gutman, supra note 142, at 661.
155. KJay Holdsworth et al., Report on Transfer Tax Restructuring, 41 TAX LAw. 395, 402
(1988). However, the authors conclude that due to the potential for abuse, the exclusion
should not be extended to cover support payments for nondependents other than for
educational and medical expenses. Id.
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estate and gift tax reform measures.15 6 Unfortunately, the ALI's
"transfer-for-consumption" exclusion was not adopted. The text of
the ALI proposal reads as follows:
An expenditure should be excluded from transfer taxa-
tion as a lifetime transfer, under either a dual tax system or a
unified tax, if the expenditure is for:
(a) the benefit of any person residing in the trans-
feror's household, or the benefit of a child of the transferor
under 21 years of age, whether or not he resides in the trans-
feror's household, provided that such expenditure does not
result in such person or child acquiring property which will
retain significant value after the passage of one year from the
date of such expenditure; or
(b) current educational, medical or dental costs of any
person, or
(c) current costs of food, clothing and maintenance of
living accommodations of any person in fact dependent on
the transferor, in whole or in part, for support, provided
such expenditures are reasonable in amount. 5 7
The ALI proposal does not, directly, predicate a gift exclusion on
fulfillment of any moral or legal obligation regarding support.
Rather, the premise for the exclusion rests on the foundation for es-
tate and gift taxes: a tax on the privilege of transferring wealth. Quite
logically, when wealth is consumed, it is no longer wealth. Clearly,
wealth consumed for an individual's own benefit is not a transfer for
gift tax purposes 158 nor does it remain as part of his estate at death for
estate tax purposes.1 59 If we were to view certain related or otherwise
close individuals as being one family unit, or pseudo-individual, then
inter vivos transfers of assets to any member of this group for such
156. Ray, supra note 13, at 446 (citing Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90
Stat. 1520 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.)). The recommenda-
tions of the American Law Institute made it all the way to the House Committee on Ways
and Means before it was defeated. Id.
157. AMERCAN LAw INST., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION
19, 20-21 (1969) [hereinafter ALI PROPOSAL].
158. The receipt of services or property (which is subsequently consumed) in exchange
for transfers of wealth, must constitute consideration in money or money's worth. See supra
notes 35-50 and accompanying text (discussing valid consideration for gift tax purposes).
159. The gross estate includes the value of all property, wherever situated, that the dece-
dent had an interest in at the time of death. I.R.C. § 2031(a) (1988). This includes the
amount of cash belonging to the decedent at the date of death. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-5
(1958). However, any amount of cash the decedent consumed for self-support prior to
death is excluded from the estate. This result is quite logical because amount of wealth
consumed does not give rise to any valuable asset and cannot be transferred to the dece-
dent's heirs. Id.
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member's consumption would likewise be excluded. 1 ° The ALl pro-
posal effectively does just this.
One can also argue that the imposition of a gift tax on the trans-
fer of wealth contemplates the transfer of sustained wealth and not
just any transfer of assets.1 6 1 When property is transferred for an-
other's consumption it cannot, by default, be a transfer of sustained
wealth. It follows, therefore, that such inter vivos transfers should not
be subject to gift taxes. The ALI's 1968 transfer-for-consumption pro-
posal seeks to exclude these types of transfers from the gift tax, and
provides a workable model for gift tax reform. An analysis of the ALI
proposal vis-a-vis transfers for another's support follows.
1. No Transfers of Sustained Wealth.-The ALI proposal contem-
plates an exclusion for transfers to certain individuals. The categories
of permissible transferees (and any transferee-specific transfer restric-
tions) are addressed later, but a key component of the ALI proposal
relates to the nature of the transfer. Only transfers to qualifying indi-
viduals that are not transfers of sustained wealth can be excluded
from the gift tax. In describing one category of excluded transfers,
the proposal states: "[Transfers shall be excluded] provided that such
expenditure does not result in [the transferee] ... acquiring property
which will retain any significant value after the passage of one year
from the date of ... [such transfer]."16 This is the consumption na-
160. The "pseudo-individual" includes any person residing in the transferor's house-
hold, a child of the transferor under 21 years of age, an individual for whom the transferor
is providing educational, medical, or dental costs, and any person dependent on the trans-
feror, in whole or in part, for support. ALI PROPOSAL, supra note 157, at 20-21.
161. This concept is consistent with the historical estate tax justification of preventing
the accumulation of wealth in a limited number of families. In 1906 President Theodore
Roosevelt expressed that "the prime objective [of taxing an estate] should be to put a
constantly increasing burden on the inheritance of those swollen fortunes which it is cer-
tainly of no benefit to this country to perpetuate." BIrrIrR & CLARK, supra note 3, at 3-4
(quoting 17 WORKS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 434 (1925)). Andrew Carnegie supported
this rationale and said,
Men who continue hoarding great sums all their lives, the proper use of which for
public ends would work good to the community from which it chiefly came,
should be made to feel that the community, in the form of the State, cannot thus
be deprived of its proper share.
Id. (quoting ANDREW CARNEGIE, THE GOSPEL OF WEALTH 21-22 (1962)). In addition, mod-
ern theorists recognize that the estate tax plays a significant role in the distribution of the
overall tax burden, and helps to maintain progressivity in the federal tax system. Id. at 6.
162. AL PROPOSAL, supra note 157, at 20-2 1. This "one-year" language appears only with
respect to the first category of qualified transferees, any person living with the transferor or
the transferor's child under the age of 21. Id.; see also infra notes 174-179 and accompany-
ing text. Curiously, in the discussion draft of the ALI's proposal, the "one-year" require-
ment applied not only to this first category of qualified transferees, but also applied to
those transferees dependent in whole or in part on the transferor for support. AMERICAN
1996] 377
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
ture of the proposal. It effectively confirms the notion that an inter
vivos transfer for another's consumption is not an attempt by the
transferor to transfer sustained wealth to another individual and de-
plete the transferor's estate, thereby escaping the estate tax. 163 When
wealth is merely consumed and not transferred, the gift tax's role as a
backstop to the estate tax is not implicated.164
To be considered for this exclusion, therefore, property trans-
ferred must be consumed by the transferee-with no lingering wealth
remaining in the transferee's hands.165 Assuming the transferee fits a
qualifying profile, 1" transfers of money for such items as the trans-
feree's food and lodging would clearly come within the exclusion: cur-
rent costs, where wealth would almost immediately be consumed,
resulting in no retention of an asset with value one year after the
transfer. A clear example of a transfer not coming within this exclu-
sion is a transfer, in fee, of a house. While arguably it is a transfer
LAW INST., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAx PROJECT, DISCUSSION DRAFT OF RECOMMENDA-
TIONS 17, 19 (1968) [hereinafter AL PROPOSAL DRAFT]. In the proposal draft, the one-year
requirement specifically was not applicable to transfers for educational, medical, or dental
costs. Id. at 19. The omission of this one-year requirement to all categories of transfers
enumerated in the final ALI proposal is, most likely, of little consequence however. The
proposal's use of the word "current" with respect to educational, medical, dental, and sup-
port expenditures, connotes a transfer of property that is consumed in the near term,
consistent with a one-year requirement. AU PROPOSAL, supra note 157, at 20-21.
163. The logic of "for-consumption" transfers could conceivably extend to testamentary
transfers: a transfer of property that is consumed by the testamentary beneficiary within a
short period of time after the decedent's death. However, this would not be an appropri-
ate extension because the focus of a for-consumption exclusion is only on those lifetime
transfers that do not otherwise defeat the estate tax by depleting one's estate by predeath
transfers of wealth. Denial of such a for-consumption exclusion for estate tax purposes is
also consistent with the fact that the estate tax provisions are void of any I.R.C. § 2503-type
exclusions. "The proposal as to transfers for consumption is applicable only to lifetime
transfers. The considerations behind the proposal do not carry over significantly to death-
time dispositions. This, of course, is also true of the annual per-donee exclusion which is
not available with respect to deathtime transfers." ALI PROPOSAL, supra note 157, at 20-21.
164. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
165. Curiously, the ALI proposal discussion draft did not contain the prohibition of
transferring sustained wealth (specific exemption from the "retention of significant value
beyond one year" requirement) with respect to transfers for educational or medical pur-
poses. ALI PROPOSAL DRAFT, supra note 162, at 19. The proposal draft did, nonetheless,
require that transfers for such purposes be for "current costs." Id. The two signals seem to
point in different directions. The final proposal also contains this current cost require-
ment, which would seem to effectively preclude the transfer of sustained wealth. See supra
note 162.
166. The ALI proposal requires that for the exclusion to apply to transferees other than
the transferor's child under the age of 21 or someone residing in the transferor's house-
hold, the transfer must either be for "educational, medical or dental costs," or "food, cloth-
ing and maintenance of living accommodations" that must be "reasonable in amount."
ALI PROPOSAL, supra note 157, at 21; see also infra notes 174-194 and accompanying text
(discussing different classes of permissible transfers and transferees).
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providing lodging to the transferee, it also results in the transfer of
sustained wealth and not merely current costs because the house re-
tains substantial value beyond one year. 167
The ALI transfer-for-consumption exclusion also works very well
in the Dickman use-of-property type situations. The use of property it-
self, as contrasted to outright transfer of ownership, represents con-
sumption and nothing more. 168 If, as the court in Dickman stated,
giving someone the use of property is itself the transfer of a valuable
property right (the use thereof), then such a transfer would, nonethe-
less, be excluded from gift tax under the transfer-for-consumption
proposal if other requirements of the exclusion are met.169 Assuming
the transferee is not granted use of the property for a specified term
exceeding one year (such as a term of years or life interest),'17  no
sustained or lingering wealth has been transferred. 171
167. It would seem that the determination of whether a cost is a current cost or an asset
that will have significant value after one year must be made at the time of the gift. This
would mean that events subsequent to the transfer that have an effect on the length of
sustained value would be disregarded. The IRS would, of course, be suspicious of an initial
determination of no substantial value beyond one year (and, therefore, no gift) when the
transferred asset, in fact, does retain substantial value beyond the year. This idea is consis-
tent with the proposition regarding valuation of gifts in general where the determination
of value is made at the time of the gift based upon all known facts and circumstances and
unexpected events subsequent to the transfer are ignored (i.e., a revaluation is not appro-
priate). In the words of the IRS, "ifa gift is made in property, its value at the date of the gift
shall be considered the amount of the gift." Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (as amended in 1992)
(emphasis added).
While the IRS might suffer an occasional loss of a gift tax opportunity, taxpayers also
could be harmed by a valuation that, in hindsight, proves to have been too optimistic. For
example, if a taxpayer, at the time of transfer, determines that the asset transferred will
have substantial value beyond one year, the transfer will be precluded from exclusion
under this transfer-for-consumption proposal. Should the asset, in fact, not retain substan-
tial value beyond the year (i.e., be consumed), the subsequent events that caused the de-
cline should be given no effect and no gift tax relief should be granted.
168. "Use" means only the current use, without granting use for a prescribed length of
time (beyond one year). This must be distinguished from granting another a life or
termed interest in property (beyond one year)-in which case the value of such interest,
measured pursuant to tables prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, I.R.C. § 7520
(1988). constitutes a gift, not within the transfer-for-consumption exclusion.
169. The other requirements include a proper transferee and a proper amount of sup-
port depending on the relationship between the transferee and the transferor. See infra
notes 174-194.
170. An interesting question is whether the value of the first year of a term of years or
life interest could be considered "consumption" and therefore be excluded under the
proposal.
171. In Dickman, the taxpayer was liable for a gift tax with respect to the value of the
interest-free use of money that the taxpayer had loaned to his adult son. Dickman v. Com-
missioner, 465 U.S. 330, 338; see also supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text (discussing
Dickman). This interest was valued as the amount of interest that should have been
charged but was not. Dickman, 465 U.S. at 336-37. Subsequent to the Dickman decision, the
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The cornerstone of the ALl proposal is the exclusion for transfers
of wealth that are consumed by a transferee within a short period. 171
It is not, however, a blanket exclusion for all such for-consumption
transfers to any transferee. The ALI proposal predicates the exclusion
upon the identity of a transferee and the purpose of the transfer. 173
The categories of excluded transfers under the ALI proposal encom-
pass what would normally be considered within the realm of legal or
moral support obligations.
2. Expenditures for Transferor's Children and Persons Residing in
Transferor's Household.-The first exclusion category under the ALI
proposal is for expenditures made for "the benefit of any person resid-
ing in the transferor's household, or the benefit of a child of the
transferor under 21 years of age, whether or not he resides in the
transferor's household."174 By and large, the latter category of ex-
penditures for children of the transferor under twenty-one adds little
to current law. Expenditures for the benefit of a minor child that do
not retain substantial value beyond one year are, most likely, support-
type expenditures that, under current law, are not gifts because the
discharge of a legal support obligation is considered adequate consid-
eration. 175 To the extent a state obligation ceases at age eighteen,
concept of taxing interest-free demand loans has been codified in I.R.C. § 7872 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993). For purposes of this section, the term "loan" includes any "extension of
credit or any transaction under which the owner of money permits another person to use
the money for a period of time after Wvhich the money is to be transferred to the owner or
applied according to an agreement with the owner." Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7872-2, 50 Fed.
Reg. 161 (1985).
If the ALI proposal is adopted, I.RC. § 7872 will have to be dealt with to the extent it
conflicts with the proposal's exclusion for support-related transfers. Under the proposal,
the use of money could be an excludable transfer if it was for a qualifying purpose and
transferred to a qualifying transferee. This would require either the elimination of I.R.C.
§ 7872 in such instances or, in the alternative, the retention of the section and loss of
exclusion in cases where the use of money is involved.
172. For a further discussion of the one-year and current costs requirements, see supra
notes 162, 165, 167.
173. See infra notes 174-194 and accompanying text.
174. ALI PROPOSAL, supra note 157, at 20-21.
175. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text. The contrary, however, is not true.
Not all categories of nontaxable gifts associated with support-type transfers would come
within the ALI's exclusion proposal. An example would be the transfer of an automobile,
in fee, to a minor child of the transferor. The transfer of the automobile in exchange for
the discharge of the transferor's support obligation to provide transportation might be
considered the receipt of adequate consideration in money or money's worth, resulting in
no gift subject to gift tax. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text; see also supra notes
90-95 and accompanying text (discussing when transfers might exceed the legal obligation
of support). Viewed solely within the auspices of the ALI proposal, however, such a trans-
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however, the ALl proposal conceivably extends, for three years, possi-
ble tax-free transfers to a child.176
The ALI proposal's exclusion for expenditures for persons other
than children who reside in the transferor's household does, however,
broaden current law. Qualifying expenditures for any person residing
in the transferor's household are excluded transfers under the ALI
proposal. This class of persons clearly can include any family member
such as a parent, sibling, and the like, but can also include friends and
other nonrelatives. Transfers to such individuals, again most likely
within the context of what would be considered support related,
would be excluded as long as the transferee was residing in the trans-
feror's household. Under current law, such transfers would most
likely be considered gifts because the transfers would be arising from
a morally, as opposed to a legally, imposed obligation to support.177
The Dickman use-of-property concept should also be considered a
qualifying expenditure or transfer with respect to consumption.178
Therefore, the use of the transferor's property by a minor child or
anyone residing in the transferor's household would be exempt from
gift tax.7 9 This provision takes care of many questionable Dickman-
type gift issues under current law: the adult son living in his old bed-
room back home, and the niece who lives with her uncle and is al-
lowed to use his car.
3. Expenditures for Current Educational, Medical, and Dental
Costs.-The second exclusion category under the ALI proposal is for
expenditures made for "current education, medical or dental costs of
fer would not be an excluded gift because of an automobile's retention of value beyond
one year.
The proposal would, however, appear to address the issue, under current law, of trans-
fers that exceed the transferor's legal obligation for support. See supra notes 90-95 and
accompanying text. Under the proposal, varying levels of consumption (even well beyond
that of required support) could, nonetheless, fall within the exclusion because there would
be no retention of significant value beyond one year.
176. Interestingly, the ALI's proposal discussion draft used the term "minor child" in-
stead of "a child of the transferor under the age of 21." ALl PROPOSAL DRAFr, supra note
162, at 19.
177. Typically, there is no legal obligation to support unrelated individuals or family
members other than minor children. See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text. Note
that excluded transfers under this category of the All proposal require only that a quali-
fied child transferee reside in the transferor's household. It does not require that such
transferee in any way be dependent upon the transferor for support. See infra notes 186-
193 and accompanying text (discussing transfers to persons who are so dependent, but do
not live with the transferor).
178. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
179. The possible exception might come under a retention of current I.R.C. § 7872 with
respect to the use of money. See supra note 171.
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any person." 8 ' The crux of this component of the ALl proposal has
been codified in the gift tax exclusion found in I.R.C. § 2503(e)."8
There are, however, some differences between the two provisions. Re-
call that the existing exclusion provided by I.R.C. § 2503(e) for medi-
cal and educational costs requires that qualifying transfers be made
directly to the provider of such services (for example, to the school,
hospital, or doctor). Currently no exclusion covers transfers made to
the transferee that are then used by the transferee for educational or
medical purposes.1 2 The ALI proposal does not appear to predicate
the exclusion on direct payments to providers. Another possible area
of divergence is the scope of excluded educational costs. The exclu-
sion under I.R.C. § 2503(e), with respect to educational costs, is lim-
ited to tuition and does not include related costs such as books and
supplies.' 83 There is no specific language in the ALI proposal that
limits educational costs to tuition only."8 The broader exclusion of
education and medical expenditures under the ALl proposal is prefer-
able to the current I.R.C. § 2503(e) exclusion. 8 5
4. Expenditures for Support and Maintenance for Dependent Transfer-
ees. -The third and final exclusion category under the ALI proposal is
for expenditures made for "current costs of food, clothing and main-
tenance of living accommodations of any person in fact dependent on
the transferor, in whole or in part, for support, provided such expen-
diture is reasonable in amount." '86 This category of exclusion is lim-
ited in both the scope of qualifying expenditures and the class of
individuals to whom, or on whose behalf, such expenditures can be
made.
180. ALI PROPOSAL, supra note 157, at 21.
181. For a discussion of this exclusion, see supra notes 147-155 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-6(b)(3), ex. 3 & 4 (1984).
183. Id. § 25.2503-6(b) (2).
184. While the ALI proposal does not specifically identify or define the scope of ex-
cluded educational costs, given the broad application of the exclusion in its entirety, it is
logical that the drafters envisioned the application to be broader than current I.R.C.
§ 2503(e). Even if the exclusion for educational costs was not intended to be broad in
scope, most costs tangential to education (even including room and board) could come
within the purview of the proposal's other categories of exclusion. See also infra notes 186-
194 (discussing the third category of exclusion for those dependent on transferor).
185. I.R.C. § 2503(e) should be expanded to cover educational costs in addition to tui-
tion, such as books and supplies. If this were done, the rule requiring payment directly to
the provider of the services could also be relaxed. This change would allow the taxpayer to
reimburse the donee for any expenses incurred with respect to the donee's medical and
educational needs. See also Holdsworth et al., supra note 155, at 402.
186. ALI PROPOSAL, supra note 157, at 21.
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The scope of qualifying expenditures is limited to reasonable
amounts for food, clothing, and maintenance of living accommoda-
tions."8 7 While perhaps not broad enough to encompass all possible
support-type payments, it does cover what most people consider to be
the core components of support.188
The class of individuals to whom, or on whose behalf, such food,
clothing, and shelter expenditures can be made is, again, not limited
to family members nor, in this category, to individuals residing in the
transferor's household.'8 9 Such expenditures for any person qualify for
exclusion as long as the person is "dependent on the transferor, in
whole or in part, for support." ' ° This category, too, does not neces-
sarily, and in fact probably does not, coincide with any legally imposed
duty to support.191 What it does require is that there be some degree
of dependency on the transferor for support. There is nothing in the
ALI proposal that suggests the basis for determining whether an indi-
vidual is dependent upon another for support. Nevertheless, the pro-
posal's requirement that the transferee be dependent on the
transferor only in part for support, connotes a fairly broad interpreta-
tion of excludable expenditures. 9 2 It is logical to assume that an indi-
vidual transferee facing severe financial hardship would be dependent
on others for support, and thus dependent in whole or in part on
qualifying transfers (food, clothing, or shelter) made by the trans-
feror. Exactly what constitutes dependency on another for support
for purposes of this exclusion, however, is not clear.193
187. Id.
188. Reasonableness is, of course, a subjective determination based upon facts and cir-
cumstances. One must wonder whether the standard for reasonableness is coextensive
with state-law-based levels of support.
189. If a transferee is residing in transferor's household, the expenditure might also
qualify under the first category of qualifying expenditures. Residence in the transferor's
household also enlarges qualifying expenditures to include items beyond food, clothing,
and shelter. In addition, under the first category, there is no requirement that transferee
be dependent upon transferor for support. See supra notes 174-179 and accompanying
text.
190. ALI PROPOSAL, supra note 157, at 20-21.
191. Id.
192. The drafters surely did not contemplate such determination of dependency to be
so restrictive as to be limited to situations where a state-determined obligation of support is
found.
193. For example, in order to qualify, must the transferee be a "dependent" as defined
for income tax purposes requiring that another provide more than half of his total sup-
port? See I.R.C. § 152 (1988). Can a transferee qualify even though not dependent on
another for general support but dependent only with respect to the particular transfer?
The latter interpretation appears to correspond to the proposal's requirement that the
transferee need only be dependent "in part" on the transferor. Determination of depen-
dency, on a transfer-by-transfer basis, however, would be difficult and might prove imprac-
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This last category of excludable expenditures also covers the Dick-
man use-of-property scenarios.19 4 The use of property would be an
excludable transfer as long as it related to food, clothing, and shelter,
and the transferee met the aforementioned dependency
requirements.
The ALI's proposal for a transfer-for-consumption exclusion is a
viable model for gift tax reform. Although enactment of I.R.C.
§ 2503(e) was a step in the right direction, limiting the exclusion to
direct medical expenses and tuition still leaves the donor with a possi-
ble tax liability for support transfers. Adoption of the transfer-for-con-
sumption proposal, in some form, is necessary to completely exclude
certain transfers of support from the donor's taxable gifts.
The proposal as set forth is not free from problems. The ALI
itself noted that
[a] "transfer-for-consumption" exception may raise some dif-
ficult factual issues in borderline situations, but most situa-
tions will fall clearly on one side of the line or the other.
The creation of the difficult borderline area is justified to
accomplish the larger benefit of excluding [from the gift tax-
ation] typical transfers that are motivated by considerations
other than the build-up of wealth in the transferee. 95
As an alternative means to avoid tax on transfers for support,
some commentators have suggested merely changing the donor's an-
nual exclusion from $10,000 per year, per donee, 196 to some greater
amount such as $30,000 per year per donor.' 97 This, however, does
not seem appropriate.'98 Increasing the annual exclusion may benefit
those individuals who are actually making otherwise taxable gifts that
tical. Adopting the income tax determination of dependency would provide some degree
of certainty, although it might constrict this dependency category of gift tax exclusion.
194. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
195. AL PROPOSAL, supra note 157, at 20.
196. See supra note 33.
197. Joint Committee on Taxation Staff Estimate of Administration Proposal for Reduction in
Taxes on Capital Gains of Individuals, Daily Rep. for Execs. (BNA), Tax'n, Budget and Acct.
Text (Feb. 15, 1990). Changing the exclusion to $30,000 per donor, it is argued, will pre-
vent donors with many donees (for whom the donor would receive a $10,000 per donee
exclusion under current law) from escaping the gift tax on a large scale. Holdsworth et al.,
supra note 155, at 401.
198. Increasing the $10,000 amount subjects the annual exclusion to potential abuse.
Ten thousand dollars per donee is more than adequate to cover customary gifts. However,
many donors disregard these customary gifts in their computation and use the $10,000
exclusion for a tax-saving device in their financial plan. Steinkamp, supra note 25, at 171.
"By limiting the exclusion to $10,000 in current dollars, approximately one-third of the
potential for such abuse will have been eliminated as a result of inflation since 1981." Id.
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should be subject to tax and, perhaps, might not be sufficient to cover
the amount of transfers made for actual support. 99
CONCLUSION
Currently, for gift tax purposes, gifts are determined by objective,
and arguably inimical, criteria: the transferor's receipt of considera-
tion in money or money's worth. Transfers discharging a state-im-
posed legal obligation of support, such as that required for a minor
child, meet this criteria. However, where the support of another indi-
vidual stems not from a legal obligation, but a moral one, gift tax is-
sues loom prominently.
The purpose of the gift tax is to act as a backstop to the estate tax:
to prevent the tax-free, inter vivos transfer of wealth, and diminution
of an estate. Transfers for the support of an adult child or elderly
parent are motivated not by tax avoidance, nor by any legal obligation.
Rather, they originate from an individual's moral conscience-to take
care of a loved one in need. It is unlikely that Congress intended to
tax those transfers wherein the donor is merely giving financial sup-
port that is typically provided in a normal familial relationship. Even
so, without adequate consideration, support transfers are taxable gifts
under current law regardless of the donor's selfless intention.
Subjecting transfers for the support of others to the gift tax vio-
lates the core principles of human compassion and does not promote
the general policy for the imposition of a gift tax. In the gift tax
arena, discharging one's moral obligation to support another should
not be of any less weight than fulfilling one's legal support obliga-
tions. Exhibition of the most admirable and honorable of human
traits should not be penalized by the imposition of a gift tax.
Notwithstanding public policy questions regarding the imposition
of gift taxes to support transfers, there are many practical concerns
with the current law. The general public is engaged in mass, albeit
unintentional, noncompliance with the law. Unless confronted with
support-type transfers, it appears that the IRS is reluctant to actively
enforce the law. Gift tax liability and the imposition of penalties with
respect to certain common familial transfers should not depend upon
the IRS's presumed policy of nonenforcement. In addition, the tax
advisor is placed in an uncomfortable position, both ethically and le-
gally, when a client reveals the existence of such support-type trans-
199. There is already ample argument that the use of the current annual exclusion is
eclipsing its intended purpose and borders on being a sham. See generally Dora Arash,
Crummy Trusts: An Exploitation of the Annual Exclusion, 21 PEPP. L. Rxv. 83 (1993).
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fers. Current gift tax law does provide a limited exclusion from gift
tax for certain transfers made for another's educational and medical
needs, as well as a $10,000 per year (per donee) exclusion. These,
however, are not adequate to address the many other support-related
transfers that should not be subject to gift tax, but in fact, are.
The ALl proposal for a transfer-for-consumption exemption
should serve as a model for gift tax reform. This proposal effectively
eliminates from gift tax those transfers to a logical class of permissible
transferees that are not transfers of sustained wealth. Wealth that is
consumed, by an individual or those in some relationship with that
individual, is not a transfer of wealth at all and should not be consid-
ered a taxable gift. Individuals fulfilling their moral obligation to sup-
port a loved one should not bear the burden of gift taxes, and it is
appropriate for Congress to rectify the situation.
